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Abstract. Recent years have seen growing interest in high-level languages for programming networks.
But the design of these languages has been largely ad hoc, driven more by the needs of applications and the
capabilities of network hardware than by foundational principles. The lack of a semantic foundation has left
language designers with little guidance in determining how to incorporate new features, and programmers
without a means to reason precisely about their code.
This paper presents Net, a new network programming language that is based on a solid mathematical
foundation and comes equipped with a sound and complete equational theory. We describe the design of
Net, including primitives for àltering, modifying, and transmitting packets; operators for combining
programs in parallel and in sequence; and a Kleene star operator for iteration. We show that Net is an
instance of a canonical and well-studied mathematical structure called a Kleene algebra with tests () and
prove that its equational theory is sound and complete with respect to its denotational semantics. Finally, we
present practical applications of the equational theory including syntactic techniques for checking reachability
properties, proving the correctness of compilation and optimization algorithms, and establishing a non-
interference property that ensures isolation between programs.
Work perfomed while employed at Cornell University.
1. Introduction
Traditional network devices have been called “the last bastion of mainframe computing” [9]. Unlike modern
computers, which are implemented with commodity hardware and programmed using standard interfaces,
networks are built the same way as in the 1970s: out of special-purpose devices such as routers, switches,
àrewalls, load balancers, andmiddle-boxes, each implemented with custom hardware and programmed using
proprietary interfaces. This design makes it difàcult to extend networks with new functionality and effectively
impossible to reason precisely about their behavior.
However, in recent years, a revolution has taken placewith the rise of software-deàned networking (). In ,
a general-purpose controller machine manages a collection of programmable switches. The controller responds to
network events such as newly connected hosts, topology changes, and shifts in trafàc load by re-programming
the switches accordingly. This logically centralized, global view of the network makes it possible to implement a
wide variety of standard applications such as shortest-path routing, trafàc monitoring, and access control, as
well as more sophisticated applications such as load balancing, intrusion detection, and fault-tolerance using
commodity hardware.
A major appeal of  is that it deànes open standards that any vendor can implement. For example, the
OpenFlow  deànes a low-level conàguration interface that clearly speciàes the capabilities and behavior
of switch hardware. However, programs written directly for  platforms such as OpenFlow are akin to
assembly: easy for hardware to implement, but difàcult for humans to write.
Network programming languages. Several research groups have proposed domain-speciàc  program-
ming languages [5–7, 22–24, 28, 29]. These network programming languages allow programmers to specify the
behavior of each switch using high-level abstractions that a compiler translates to low-level instructions for
the underlying hardware. Unfortunately, the design of these languages has been largely ad hoc, driven more
by the needs of individual applications and the capabilities of present-day hardware than by any foundational
principles. Indeed, the lack of guiding principles has left language designers unsure about which features to
incorporate into their languages and programmers without a means to reason directly about their programs.
As an example, the NetCore language [7, 22, 23] provides a rich collection of programming primitives
including predicates that àlter packets, actions that modify and forward packets, and composition operators
that build larger policies out of smaller ones. NetCore has even been formalized in Coq. But like other network
programming languages, the design of NetCore is ad hoc. As the language has evolved, its designers have
added, deleted, and changed themeaning of primitives as needed.Without principles ormetatheory to guide its
development, the evolution of NetCore has lacked clear direction and foresight. It is not clear which constructs
are essential andwhich can be derived.When new primitives are added, it is not clear how they should interact
with existing constructs.
An even more pressing issue is that these languages specify the behavior of the switches in the network, but
nothing more. Of course, when network programs are actually executed, the end-to-end functionality of the
system is determined both by the behavior of switches and by the structure of the network topology. Hence,
to answer almost any interesting question such as “Can X connect to Y?”, “Is trafàc from A to B routed through Z?”,
or “Is there a loop involving S?”, the programmer must step outside the conànes of the linguistic model and the
abstractions it provides.
To summarize, we believe that a foundational model for network programming languages is essential. Such
a model should (1) identify the essential constructs for programming networks, (2) provide guidelines for
incorporating new features, and (3) unify reasoning about switches, topology and end-to-end behavior. No
existing network programming language meets these criteria.
Semantic foundations. We begin our development by focusing on the global behavior of the whole network.
This is in contrast to previous languages, which have focused on the local behavior of the individual switches.
Abstractly, a network can be seen as an automaton that shuttles packets from node to node along the links in its
topology. Hence, from a linguistic perspective, it is natural to begin with regular expressions, the language of
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ànite automata. Regular expressions are a natural way to specify the packet-processing behavior of a network:
a path is represented as a concatenation of processing steps (p; q;    ), a set of paths is represented using union
(p + q +    ), and iterated processing is represented using Kleene star. Moreover, by modeling networks in
this way, we get a ready-made theory for reasoning about formal properties: Kleene algebra (), a decades-old
sound and complete equational theory of regular expressions.
With Kleene algebra as the choice for representing global network structure, we can turn our attention
to specifying local switch-processing functionality. Fundamentally, a switch implements predicates to match
packets and actions that transform and forwardmatching packets. Existing languages build various abstractions
atop the predicates and actions supplied by the hardware, but predicates and actions are essential. As a
consequence, a foundational model for  must incorporate both Kleene algebra for reasoning about network
structure and Boolean algebra for reasoning about the predicates that deàne switch behavior. Fortunately, these
classicmathematical structures have already been uniàed in previouswork onKleene algebra with tests () [14].
By now  has a well-developed metatheory, including an extensive model theory and results on expres-
siveness, deductive completeness, and complexity. The axioms of  are sound and complete over a variety of
popular semantic models, including language, relational, and trace models, and  has been applied success-
fully in a number of application areas, including the veriàcation of compiler optimizations, device drivers and
communication protocols. Moreover, equivalence in  has a  decision procedure. This paper applies
this theory to a new domain: networks.
NetKAT. Net is a new framework based on Kleene algebra with tests for specifying, programming, and
reasoning about networks. As a programming language, Net has a simple denotational semantics inspired
by that of NetCore [22], but modiàed and extended in key ways to make it sound for  (which NetCore is
not). In this respect, the semantic foundation provided by  has delivered true guidance: the axioms of 
dictate the interactions between primitive program actions, predicates, and other operators. Moreover, any
future proposed primitive that violates a  axiom can be summarily rejected for breaking the equations that
allow us to reason effectively about the network. Net thus provides a foundational structure and consistent
reasoning principles that other network programming languages lack.
For speciàcation and reasoning, Net also has an axiomatic semantics, characterized by a ànite set of
equations that capture equivalences between Net programs. The equational theory includes the axioms of
, as well as domain-speciàc axioms that capture manipulations of packets. These axioms enable reasoning
about local switch processing functionality (needed in compilation and optimization) as well as global network
behavior (needed to check reachability and trafàc isolation properties). We prove that the equational theory is
sound and complete with respect to the denotational semantics. While soundness follows mostly standard
lines, our proof of completeness is novel: we construct an alternate language model for Net and leverage
the completeness of .
To evaluate the practical utility of our theory and the expressive power of Net, we demonstrate how
to use it to reason about a diverse collection of applications. First, we show that Net can pose a variety
of interesting reachability queries that network operators need to answer. Next, we state and prove a non-
interference property for networks that provides a strong form of isolation between Net programs. Finally,
we prove that Net can be correctly compiled to a low-level form analogous to switch áow tables.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We develop a new semantic foundation for network programming languages based on Kleene algebra with
tests ().
• We formalize the Net language in terms of a denotational semantics and an axiomatic semantics based
on ; we prove the equational axioms sound and complete with respect to the denotational semantics.
• We apply the equational theory in several diverse domains including reasoning about reachability, trafàc




Switch A Switch B Host 2
Figure 1. Example network.
The next section presents a simple example to motivate Net and introduces the key elements of its design.
The subsequent sections deàne the language formally, develop its main theoretical properties, and discuss
applications.
2. Overview
This section introduces the syntax and informal semantics of Net with a simple example. Consider the
network shown in Figure 1. It consists of two switches,A andB, each with two ports labeled 1 and 2, and two
hosts. The switches and hosts are connected together in series. Suppose we want to conàgure the network to
provide the following services:
• Forwarding: transfer packets between the hosts, but
• Access control: block  packets.
The forwarding component is straightforward—program each switch to forward packets destined for host 1
out port 1, and similarly for host 2—but there are many ways to implement the access control component. We
will describe several implementations and show that they are equivalent using Net’s equational theory.
Forwarding. Towarm up, let us deàne a simple Net policy that implements forwarding. To a àrst approx-
imation, a Net policy can be thought of as a function from packets to sets of packets. (In the next section
we will generalize this type to functions from lists of packets to sets of lists of packets, where the lists encode
packet-processing histories, to support reasoning about network-wide properties.) We represent packets as
records with àelds for standard headers such as source address (src), destination address (dst), and protocol
type (typ), as well as two àelds, switch (sw) and port (pt), that identify the location of the packet in the network.
The most basic Net policies are àlters and modiàcation. A àlter (f = n) takes an input packet pk and
yields the singleton set fpkg if àeld f of pk equals n, and fg otherwise. A modiàcation (f  n) takes an input




, where pk 0 is the packet obtained from pk by setting f to n.
To help programmers build richer policies, Net also has policy combinators that build bigger policies
out of smaller ones. Parallel composition (p+ q) produces the union of the sets produced by applying each of
p and q to the input packet, while sequential composition (p; q) àrst applies p to the input packet, then applies
q to each packet in the resulting set, and ànally takes the union of the resulting sets. Using these operators, we
can implement the forwarding policy for the switches:
p , (dst = H1; pt 1) + (dst = H2; pt 2)
At the top level, this policy is the parallel composition of two sub-policies. The àrst updates the pt àeld of all
packets destined for H1 to 1 and drops all other packets, while the second updates the pt àeld of all packets
destined for H2 to 2. The parallel composition of the two generates the union of their behaviors—in other
words, the policy forwards packets across the switches in both directions.
Access control. Next, we extend the policy with access control. The simplest way to do this is to compose a
àlter that blocks  trafàc with the forwarding policy:
pac , :(typ = ); p
This policy drops the input packet if its typ àeld is  and otherwise forwards it using p. Of course, a quick
inspection of the network topology shows that it is unnecessary to test all packets at all places in the network
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in order to block  trafàc: packets travelling between host 1 and host 2 must traverse both switches, so it is
sufàcient to àlter only at switch A:
pA , (sw = A;:(typ = ); p) + (sw = B; p)
or only at switch B:
pB , (sw = A; p) + (sw = B;:(typ = ); p)
These policies are slightly more complicated than the original policy, but are more efàcient because they avoid
having to store and enforce the access control policy at both switches.
Naturally, one would prefer one of the two optimized policies. Still, given these programs, there are several
questions we would like to be able to answer:
• “Are non- packets forwarded?”
• “Are  packets dropped?”
• “Are pac, pA, and pB equivalent?”
Network administrators ask these sorts of questions whenever they modify the policy or the network itself.
Note that we cannot answer them just by looking at the policies—the answers depend on the network topology.
We will see how to incorporate the topology as a part of the Net program next.
Topology. Given a program that describes the behavior of the switches, it is not hard to deàne a semantics that
accounts for the topology. For example, Guha et al. [7] deàne a network-wide operational relation that maps
sets of packets to sets of packets by modeling the topology as a partial function from locations to locations. At
each step, the semantics extracts a packet from the set of in-áight packets, applies the policy and the topology
in sequence, and adds the results back in to the set of in-áight packets. However, to reason syntactically about
network-wide behaviorwe need a uniform representation of policy and topology, not a separate auxiliary relation.
Anetwork topology is a directed graphwith switches as nodes and links as edges.We canmodel the behavior
of the topology as the parallel composition of policies, one for each link in the network. Each link policy is the
sequential composition of a àlter that retains packets located at one end of the link and a modiàcation that
updates the sw and pt àelds to the location at the other end of the link, thereby capturing the effect of sending
a packet across the link. We assume that links are uni-directional, and encode bi-directional links as pairs of
uni-directional links. For example, we canmodel the links between switchesA andBwith the following policy:
t= (sw = A; pt = 2; sw  B; pt 1) +
(sw = B; pt = 1; sw  A; pt 2)
We call such a policy a topology assertion, since it is expected to be consistent with the physical topology.
Switches meet topology. A packet traverses the network in interleaved steps, processed àrst by a switch,
then sent along the topology, and so on. In our example, if host 1 sends a non- packet to host 2, it is àrst
processed by switch A, then the link between A and B, and ànally by switch B. This can be encoded by the
Net term pac; t; pac. More generally, a packet may require an arbitrary number of steps—in particular, if the
network topology has a cycle. Using the Kleene star operator, which iterates a policy zero or more times, we
can encode the end-to-end behavior of the network:
(pac; t)*; pac
Note however that this policy processes packets that enter and exit the network at arbitrary locations, including
internal locations such as on the link between switchesA andB. In proofs, it is often useful to restrict attention
to packets that enter and exit the network at speciàed external locations e:
e , (sw = A; pt = 1) + (sw = B; pt = 2)
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Using this predicate, we can restrict the policy to packets sent or received by one of the hosts:
pnet , e; (pac; t)*; pac; e
More generally, the input and output predicates may be distinct:
in; (p; t)*; p; out
We call a networkmodeled in this way a logical crossbar [20], since it encodes the end-to-end processing behavior
of the network (and elides processing steps on internal hops). This encoding is inspired by the model used in
Header Space Analysis [10]. Section 3 discusses a more reàned encoding that models hop-by-hop processing.
Formal reasoning. We now turn to formal reasoning problems and investigate whether the logical crossbar
pnet correctly implements the speciàed forwarding and access control policies. It turns out that these questions,
and many others, can be reduced to policy equivalence. We write p  q when p and q return the same set of
packets on all inputs, and p  q when p returns a subset of the packets returned by q on all inputs. Note that
p  q can be treated as an abbreviation for p+ q  q. To establish that pnet correctly àlters all  packets, we
check the following equivalence:
(typ = ; pnet)  drop
To establish that pnet correctly forwards non- packets fromH1 toH2, we check the following inclusion:
(:(typ = ); sw = A; pt = 1; sw  B; pt 2)
 (:(typ = ); sw = A; pt = 1; pnet; sw = B; pt = 2)
and similarly for non- packetsH2 toH1. Lastly, to establish that some trafàc can get from port 1 on switch
A to port 2 on switch B, we check the following:
(sw = A; pt = 1; pnet; sw = B; pt = 2) 6 drop
Of course, to actually check these equivalences, we need a proof system. Net is designed to not only be an
expressive programming language, but also one that satisàes the axioms of a Kleene algebra with tests ().
Moreover, by extending  with additional axioms that capture the domain-speciàc features of networks, the
equational theory is complete—i.e., it can answer all the questions posed in this section, and many more. The
following sections present the syntax, semantics, and equational theory of Net formally (Section 3), prove
that the equational theory is sound and complete with respect to the semantics (Section 4), and illustrate its
effectiveness on a broad range of questions including additional reachability properties (Section 5), program
isolation (Section 6) and compiler correctness (Section 7).
3. Netkat
This section deànes the Net syntax, semantics, and equational theory formally.
Preliminaries. A packet pk is a record with àelds f1; : : : ; fk mapping to àxed-width integers n. We assume a
ànite set of packet headers, including Ethernet and  source and destination addresses,  tag,  and 
ports, along with special àelds for the switch (sw), port (pt), and payload. For simplicity, we assume that every
packet contains the same àelds. We write pk :f for the value in àeld f of pk , and pk [f := n] for the packet
obtained by updating àeld f of pk with n.
To facilitate reasoning about the paths a packet takes through the network, we maintain a packet history
that records the state of each packet as it travels from switch to switch. Formally, a packet history h is a
non-empty sequence of packets. We write pk ::hi to denote a history with one element, pk ::h to denote the
history constructed by prepending pk on to h , and hpk1; : : : ; pkni for the history with elements pk1 to pkn.
By convention, the àrst element of a history is the current packet; other elements represent older packets. We
write H for the set of all histories, and P(H) for the powerset of H.
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Syntax
Fields f ::= f1 j    j fk
Packets pk ::= ff1 = v1;    ; fk = vkg
Histories h ::= pk ::hi j pk ::h
Predicates a; b; c ::= id Identity
j drop Drop
j f = n Match
j a+ b Disjunction
j a; b Conjunction
j :a Negation
Policies p; q; r ::= a Filter
j f  n Modiàcation
j p+ q Parallel composition
j p; q Sequential composition
j p* Kleene star
j dup Duplication
Semantics JpK 2 H! P(H)JidK h , fhgJdropK h , fg
Jf = nK (pk ::h), fpk ::hg if pk :f = nfg otherwiseJ:aK h , fhg n (JaK h)Jf  nK (pk ::h), fpk [f := n]::hgJp+ qK h , JpK h [ JqK hJp; qK h , (JpK . JqK) hJp*K h ,Si2N F i h
where F 0 h , fhg and F i+1 h , (JpK . F i) hJdupK (pk ::h), fpk ::(pk ::h)g
Kleene Algebra Axioms
p+ (q + r)  (p+ q) + r KA-P-A
p+ q  q + p KA-P-C
p+ drop  p KA-P-Z
p+ p  p KA-P-I
p; (q; r)  (p; q); r KA-S-A
id; p  p KA-O-S
p; id  p KA-S-O
p; (q + r)  p; q + p; r KA-S-D-L
(p+ q); r  p; r + q; r KA-S-D-R
drop; p  drop KA-Z-S
p; drop  drop KA-S-Z
id+ p; p*  p* KA-U-L
q + p; r  r) p*; q  r KA-L-L
id+ p*; p  p* KA-U-R
p+ q; r  q) p; r*  q KA-L-R
Additional Boolean Algebra Axioms
a+ (b; c)  (a+ b); (a+ c) BA-P-D
a+ id  id BA-P-O
a+ :a  id BA-E-M
a; b  b; a BA-S-C
a;:a  drop BA-C
a; a  a BA-S-I
Packet Algebra Axioms
f  n; f 0  n0  f 0  n0; f  n; if f 6= f 0 PA-M-M-C
f  n; f 0 = n0  f 0 = n0; f  n; if f 6= f 0 PA-M-F-C
dup; f = n  f = n; dup PA-D-F-C
f  n; f = n  f  n PA-M-F
f = n; f  n  f = n PA-F-M
f  n; f  n0  f  n0 PA-M-M
f = n; f = n0  drop; if n 6= n0 PA-CP
i
f = i  id PA-M-A
Figure 2. NetKAT: syntax, semantics, and equational axioms.
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KAT-I If a; p  p; a then a; p*  a; (p; a)* Lemma 2.3.2 in [14]
KAT-S p; (q; p)*  (p; q)*; p Identity 19 in [14]
KAT-D p*; (q; p*)*  (p+ q)* Identity 20 in [14]
KAT-C If for all atomic x in q, x; p  p;x then q; p  p; q Corollary of Lemma 4.4 in [2]
Figure 3.  theorems.
Syntax. Syntactically, Net expressions are divided into two categories: predicates (a; b; c) and policies
(p; q; r). Predicates include constants true (id) and false (drop), matches (f = n), and negation (:a), disjunction
(a+b), and conjunction (a; b) operators. Policies include predicates, modiàcations (f  n), parallel (p+q) and
sequential (p; q) composition, iteration (p*), and a special policy that records the current packet in the history
(dup). The complete syntax of Net is given in Figure 2. By convention, (*) binds tighter than (; ), which
binds tighter than (+). Hence, a; b+ c; d* is the same as (a; b) + (c; (d*)).
Semantics. Semantically, every Net predicate and policy denotes a function that takes a history h and
produces a (possibly empty) set of histories fh1; : : : ; hng. Producing the empty set models dropping the packet
(and its history); producing a singleton set models modifying or forwarding the packet to a single location; and
producing a set with multiple histories models modifying the packet in several ways or forwarding the packet
to multiple locations. Note that policies only ever inspect or modify the àrst (current) packet in the history. This
means implementations need not actually record histories—they are only needed for reasoning.
Figure 2 deànes the denotational semantics of Net. There is no separate deànition for predicates—every
predicate is a policy, and the semantics of (; ) and (+) are the same whether they are composing policies or
predicates. The syntactic distinction between policies and predicates arises solely to ensure that negation is only
applied to a predicate, and not, for example, to a policy such as p*. Formally, a predicate denotes a function that
returns either the singleton fhg or the empty set fgwhen applied to a history h. Hence, predicates behave like
àlters. A modiàcation (f  n) denotes a function that returns a singleton history in which the àeld f of the
current packet has been updated to n. Parallel composition (p+ q) denotes a function that produces the union
of the sets generated by p and q, and sequential composition (p; q) denotes the Kleisli composition ( . ) of the
functions p and q, where the Kleisli composition of functions of type H! P(H) is deàned as:
(f . g) x ,
[
fg y j y 2 f xg :
Policy iteration p* is interpreted as a union of semantic functionsFi of h , where eachFi is theKleisli composition
of function denoted by p i times. Finally, dup denotes a function that duplicates the current packet and adds it
to the history. Since modiàcation updates the packet at the head of the history, dup “freezes” the current state
of the packet and makes it observable.
Equational theory. Net, as its name suggests, is an extension of Kleene algebra with tests.
Formally, a Kleene algebra () is an algebraic structure (K; +; ; *; 0; 1), whereK is an idempotent semiring
under (+; ; 0; 1), and p*  q (respectively q  p*) is the least solution of the afàne linear inequality p  r + q  r
(respectively r p+q  r), where p  q is an abbreviation for p+q = q. The axioms of  are listed in Figure 2.
The axioms are shown in the syntax Net, which uses the more suggestive names ;, drop, and id for , 0, and
1, respectively.
A Kleene algebra with tests () is a two-sorted algebra
(K; B; +; ; *; 0; 1; :)
with : a unary operator deàned only on B, such that
• (K; +; ; *; 0; 1) is a Kleene algebra,
• (B; +; ; : ; 0; 1) is a Boolean algebra, and
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• (B; +; ; 0; 1) is a subalgebra of (K; +; ; 0; 1).
Elements of B and K are usually called tests and actions respectively; we will identify them with Net
predicates and policies. The axioms of Boolean algebra consist of the axioms of idempotent semirings (already
listed as  axioms) and the additional axioms listed in Figure 2.
It is easy to see that Net has the required syntactic structure to be a . However, the  axioms are
not complete for the underlying Net packet model. To establish completeness, we also need the packet
algebra axioms listed in Figure 2. The àrst three axioms specify commutativity conditions. For example, PA-
M-M-C states that assignments src  X and dst  Y can be applied in either order, as src and dst
are different:
src X; dst Y  dst Y ; src X
Similarly, axiom PA-M-F-C states that the assignment src X andpredicate sw = A can be applied
in either order. The axiom PA-D-F-C states that every predicate commutes with dup. Interestingly,
only this single axiom is needed to characterize dup in the equational theory. The next few axioms characterize
modiàcations. The PA-M-F axiom states that modifying a àeld f to n and then àltering on packets with
f equal to n is equivalent to the modiàcation alone. Similarly, the axiom PA-F-M states that àltering
on packets with àeld f equal to n and then modifying that àeld to n is equivalent to just the àlter. PA-M-
M states that only the last assignment in a sequence of assignments to the same f has any effect. The last two
axioms characterize àlters. The axiom PA-C states that a àeld cannot be equal to two different values at the
same time. Finally, the axiom PA-M-A states that the sum of àlters on every possible value is equivalent
to the identity. This implies packet values are drawn from a ànite domain, such as àxed-width integers.
A simple example: access control. To illustrate the Net equational theory, we prove a simple equivalence
using the policies from Section 2. Recall that the policy pA àltered  packets on switch A while pB àltered
 packets on switch B. We prove that these programs are equivalent on  trafàc going from left to right
across the network topology shown in Figure 1. This can be seen as a simple form of code motion—moving
the àlter from switch A to switch B. We use the logical crossbar encoding with input and output predicates
deàned as follows:
in , (sw = A; typ = ) and out , (sw = B)
The proof, given in Figure 4, is a straightforward calculation using the equational axioms and some standard
 theorems, listed in Figure 3. The shaded term on each line indicates a term that will be changed in the next
proof step. To lighten the notation we write sA for (sw = A) and similarly for sB , and  for (typ = ).
4. Soundness, Completeness, and Decidability
This section proves the soundness and completeness of the Net axioms with respect to the denotational
semantics deàned in Section 3. That is, every equation provable from the axioms of Net also holds in the
denotational model (Theorem 1) and every equality that holds in the denotational model is provable using
the axioms (Theorem 2). In addition, we establish the decidability of Net equivalence, and show that the
algorithm is -complete.
To accomplish this, we prove results that aremuch stronger andmore enlightening froma theoretical point of
view. For soundness, we show that the packet-history model used in the denotational semantics is isomorphic
to another model based on binary relations, and appeal to the soundness of  over binary relation models.
That elements of our packet-history model can be represented as binary relations is not particularly surprising.
What is more surprising is that one can also formulate language models that play the same role in Net as
the regular sets of strings in  or the regular sets of guarded strings in . These models are the free  and
, respectively, on their generators, and the same holds for our Net language model. Relating packet-
history models and language models plays a crucial role in the proof given here—it allows us to leverage the
completeness of .
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in; (pA; t)*; pA;out
 f deànition in , out , and pA g
sA; ; ((sA;:; p+ sB; p); t)*; pA; sB
 f KAT-I g
sA; ; ((sA;:; p+ sB; p); t; )*; pA; sB
 f KA-S-D-R g
sA; ; (sA;:;p; t; + sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB
 f KAT-C g
sA; ; (sA;:; ; p; t+ sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB
 f BA-C g
sA; ; (sA; drop; p; t+ sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB
 f KA-S-Z, KA-Z-S,KA-P-C, KA-P-Z g
sA; ; (sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB
 f KA-U-L g
sA; ; (id+ (sB; p; t; ); (sB; p; t; )*); pA; sB
 f KA-S-D-L and KA-S-D-R g
(sA; ; pA; sB)+
(sA; ; sB; p; t; ; (sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB)
 f KAT-C g
(sA; sB; ; pA)+
(sA; sB; ; p; t; ; (sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB)
 f PA-C g
(drop; ; pA)+
(drop; ; p; t; ; (sB; p; t; )*; pA; sB)
 f KA-Z-S, KA-P-I g
drop
 f KA-S-Z, KA-Z-S, KA-P-I g
sA; (pB; t)*; (;drop; p+ sB;drop; p; sB)
 f PA-C and BA-C g
sA; (pB; t)*; (; sA; sB; p+ sB; ;:; p; sB)
 f KAT-C g
sA; (pB; t)*; (; sA;p; sB + ; sB;:; p; sB)
 f KA-S-D-L and KA-S-D-R g
sA; (pB; t)*; ; (sA; p+ sB;:; p); sB
 f KAT-C g
sA; ; (pB; t)*; (sA; p+ sB;:; p); sB
 f deànition in , pB , and out g
in; (pB; t)*; pB; out
Figure 4. Access control code motion proof.
4.1 Soundness
To prove soundness, it is helpful to reformulate the standard packet-history semantics introduced in Section 3
in terms of binary relations. In the standard semantics, policies and predicates are modeled as functionsJpK : H ! P(H). This semantics is isomorphic to a relational semantics [] in which each policy and predicate
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is interpreted as a binary relation [p]  H H:
(h1; h2) 2 [p] , h2 2 JpK (h1):
Intuitively [p] is the set of input-output pairs of the policy p.
Formally, the maps JpK : H ! P(H) are morphisms of type H ! H in KlP , the Kleisli category of the
powerset monad. It is well known that the Kleisli category KlP is isomorphic to the category Rel of sets and
binary relations, as witnessed by currying:
X ! P(Y ) = X ! Y ! 2 = X  Y ! 2 = P(X  Y ):
In the relational model [], product is interpreted as ordinary relational composition, and the remaining 
operations translate under the isomorphism to the usual  operations on binary relations. Since the relational
model with these distinguished operations satisàes the axioms of  (see e.g. [14, 17]), so do Net models
with the packet-history semantics of Section 3.
Let ` denote provability in Net. We are now ready to prove the soundness of the  axioms.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). The  axioms with the equational premises of Figure 2 are sound with respect to the semantics
of Section 3. That is, if ` p  q, then JpK = JqK.
Proof sketch. We have already argued that any packet history model is isomorphic to a relational , therefore
satisàes all the axioms of  listed in Figure 2. It remains to show that the specialized Net axioms on the
right-hand side of Figure 2 are satisàed. These can all be veriàed by elementary arguments in relational algebra
(see e.g. [26]). Some are special cases of [2, Equations (6)–(11)], whose soundness is proved in [2, Theorem 4.3].
See Appendix A for the full proof.
4.2 Completeness
The proof of completeness proceeds in four steps:
1. We deàne reduced Net, a subset of Net where policies are a regular expression over atoms (a normal
form for sequences of tests), complete assignments (a normal form for sequences of modiàcations), and dup.
We show that everyNet policy is provably equivalent to a reducedNet policy and that reduced terms
have a simpliàed set of axioms pertaining to assignments and tests.
2. Inspired by past proofs of completeness for  and , we develop a language model for reduced Net.
This languagemodel gives semantics to policies via regular sets of I , a set of guarded join-irreducible strings.
We prove the language model and the standard model of Net are isomorphic.
3. We deàne normal forms for Net and show that every reduced Net policy is provably equivalent to
its normal form.
4. We prove completeness by relating the language model to the Net normal forms.
The rest of this section outlines the major steps of the proof.
Step 1: reduced NetKAT. Let f1; : : : ; fk be a list of all àelds of a packet in some (àxed) order. For each tuple
n = n1; : : : ; nk of values, let f = n and f  n denote the expressions
f1 = n1;    ; fk = nk f1  n1;    ; fk  nk;
respectively. The former expression is called an atom and the latter a complete assignment. The terminology
atom comes from the fact that it is an atomic (minimal nonzero) element of the Boolean algebra generated
by the primitive tests f = n. Note that the atoms and complete assignments are in one-to-one correspondence
according to the values n. Hence, if  is an atom, we denote the corresponding complete assignment by  ,
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Syntax
Atoms ;  , f1 = n1;    ; fk = nk
Assignments  , f1  n1;    ; fk  nk
Join-irreducibles x; y 2 At ; (P ; dup)*;P
Simpliàed axioms for At and P




  ; ;0  0 ;  drop;  6= 
Join-irreducible concatenation
; p;  ; q;0 =
(
; p; q;0 if  = 
undeàned if  6= 
A  B = fp  q j p 2 A; q 2 Bg  I
Regular Interpretation: R(p)  (P +At + dup)*
R() = fg
R(p+ q) = R(p) [R(q)
R() = fg






with p0 = 1 and pn+1 = p; pn
Language Model:G(p)  I = At ; (P ; dup)*;P
G() = f; j  2 Atg
G(p+ q) = G(p) [G(q)
G() = f;g
G(p; q) = G(p)  G(q)





Figure 5. Completeness deànitions.
and if  is a complete assignment, we denote the corresponding atom by  . We letAt denote the set of atoms
and P the set of complete assignments.
Now that we have deàned atoms and complete assignments, we investigate their properties. The left-hand
side of Figure 5 does so via a series of simple axioms. Each axiom is easily provable using the full Net
axioms. A useful consequence of the axioms is that the sum of corresponding atoms and complete assignments
is equivalent to the identity: P
2At ;  id
Now, the proof that any policy is equivalent to a policy in which all atomic assignments f  n appear in the
context of a complete assignment is straight-forward.
f  n  id; f  n
 (P2At ;); (f  n)
 P2At ;0
where 0 is  with the assignment to f replaced by f  n. Similarly, all tests are equivalent to sums of atoms:
b  Pb 
Since all modiàcations can be replaced by complete assignments and all tests by atoms, any Net policy p
may be viewed as a regular expression over the alphabet P [At [ fdupg. The top right of Figure 5 shows this
by deàning a mapping R from reduced Net to regular sets.
Step 2: language model. Both  and  have a language model in which each expression is interpreted as
a regular set of join-irreducible (minimal non-zero) terms. For , the language model is the  of regular sets
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of strings, and for , it is the  of regular sets of guarded strings [17]. Net also has a language model.
It consists of regular subsets of a restricted class of guarded strings I = At ; (P ; dup)*;P . Each string drawn
from this set has the form
;0; dup;1; dup;    ; dup;n (4.1)
for some n  0. These strings represent the join-irreducible elements of the standard model of Net.
The bottom right of Figure 5 deànes the language model as a mappingG from reduced Net expressions
to regular subsets of I . The case for sequential composition makes use of the concatenation operator () over
strings from I , which we lift to concatenation of sets of strings from I . Both deànitions appear on the bottom
left of Figure 5.
Note that  is partial on strings but total on sets. Using the simpliàed axioms of Fig. 5, it is easily shown
that  on strings is associative and on sets is associative, distributes over union, and has two-sided identity
f; j  2 Atg. Also note that if ; p;  ; q;0 exists, then ` ; p;;; q;0  ; p;  ; q;0 and
; p;  ; q;0 2 I , and otherwise ` ; p;;; q;0  drop.
Given our newly deàned language model, the next step is to show that it is isomorphic to the standard
packet model presented in Section 3. We àrst show that every expression is the join of its join-irreducibles,1
using a straightforward proof by induction on p.
Lemma 1. For all reduced policies p, we have JpK = Sx2G(p) JxK.
Next we show that every x in I is completely determined by JxK.
Lemma 2. If x; y 2 I , then JxK = JyK if and only if x = y.
Finally, using Lemmas 1 and 2, we conclude that the language model is isomorphic to the denotational model
presented earlier.
Lemma 3. For all reduced Net policies p and q, we have JpK = JqK if and only ifG(p) = G(q).
Step 3: NetKAT normal forms. A policy is guarded if it is of the form ;;x;0 or ;. An expression p is in
normal form if it is a sum of zero or more guarded terms andR(p)  I . A policy is normalizable if it is equivalent
to a policy in normal form.
Lemma 4. Every policy is normalizable.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of policies. To begin, the primitive symbols are normal-
izable:
h n  P2At ;0
dup  P2At ; ; dup;
b  Pb ;
Next, we show that sums and products of normalizable expressions are normalizable. The case for sums is


















si  tj :
The most interesting case is for Kleene star. Consider an expression p*, where p is in normal form. We àrst
prove the uniform case: when all guarded terms in the sum p have the same initial atom , that is, p = ; t
where t is a sum of terms each with a leading and trailing , andR(t)  P ; (dup;P )*. Let u be twith all terms
1We abuse notation slightly here by applying the union operator
S




whose trailing  is not  deleted and with the trailing  deleted from all remaining terms. By the simpliàed
axioms of Figure 5, we have t;; t  u; t, therefore t;; t;  u; t;. Using [2, Lemma 4.4],
(t;)*; t  t+ t;; (t;)*; t
 t+ u*; t;; t
 t+ u*;u; t
 u*; t;
and hence
p*  id+ p*; p
 id+ (; t)*;; t
 id+ ; (t;)*; t
 id+ ;u*; t
 id+ ; t+ ;u;u*; t;
which after normalizing the id is in normal form.
Finally, for the case p* where the initial tests in the sum p are not uniform, the argument is by induction on
the number of terms in the sum. If p = ;x + q, then by induction hypothesis, q* has an equivalent normal
form q^*. Using KAT-D (Figure 3), we obtain
p*  (;x+ q)*  q*; (;x; q*)*  q^*; (;x; q^*)*;
and then proceed as in the previous case.
Step 4: Completeness. We need just two further lemmas before delivering the completeness result that relates
R and G. Lemma 5 states that G(p) is equal to the join of the elements of R(p). The proof is by induction on






Next, Lemma 6 shows thatR(p) = G(p) ifR(p) is a subset of the join-irreducibles. The proof is straightfor-
ward using Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. IfR(p)  I , thenR(p) = G(p).








The proof of completeness for Net now follows from our lemmas and completeness of  [12].
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Every semantically equivalent pair of expressions is provably equivalent in Net. That is,
if JpK = JqK, then ` p  q.
Proof. Let p^ and q^ be the normal forms of p and q. By Lemma 4,we can prove that each is equivalent to its normal
form: ` p  p^ and ` q  q^. By soundness we have JpK = Jp^K and JqK = Jq^K. Hence Jp^K = Jq^K by transitivity.
By Lemma 3, we have G(p^) = G(q^). Moreover, by Lemma 6, we have G(p^) = R(p^) and G(q^) = R(q^), thus
R(p^) = R(q^) by transitivity. Since R(p^) and R(q^) are regular sets, by the completeness of , we also have
` p^  q^. Finally, as` p  p^ and` q  q^ and` p^  q^, by transitivitywe conclude that` p  q, as required.
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4.3 Decidability
The following theorem shows that the deciding the equational theory of Net is no more nor less difàcult
than  or .
Theorem 3. The equational theory of Net is -complete.
Proof sketch. To show -hardness, reduce  to Net as follows. Let be a ànite alphabet. For a regular
expression e over , let R(e) be the regular set of strings over  as deàned in §4. Transform e to a Net
expression e0 by replacing each occurrence in e of a symbol p 2  with (p; dup) and prepending with an
arbitrary but àxed atom . It follows from Lemmas 3 and 6 that R(e1) = R(e2) if and only if R(e01) = R(e02)
if and only ifG(e01) = G(e02) if and only if Je01K = Je02K.
To show that the problem is in , given two Net expressions e1 and e2, we know that Je1K 6= Je2K
if and only if there is a packet pk and packet history h such that h 2 Je1K (pk) n Je2K (pk) or h 2 Je2K (pk) nJe1K (pk); let us say the former without loss of generality. We guess pk nondeterministically and follow a
nondeterministically-guessed trajectory through e1 that produces some h 2 Je1K (pk). At the same time, we
trace all possible trajectories through e2 that could generate a preàx of h, ensuring that none of these produce
h 2 Je2K. It takes only polynomial space to represent the current values of the àelds of the head packet and
the possible positions in e2 for the current preàx of h. The algorithm is nondeterministic, but can be made
deterministic using Savitch’s theorem.
5. Reachability Properties
One of the most common networking problems occurs when a conàguration is changed and two hosts can no
longer communicate for some reason or another. To diagnose such problems, network operators often need
to reason about reachability properties. This section shows how to encode two common reachability properties
as succinct Net equations. Moreover, we prove that our equations are equivalent to intuitive deànitions of
reachability queries deàned in the packet-history semantics by appealing to the language model deàned in the
previous section.
Reachability. The simplest kind of reachability property is just “Can host A send packets to host B?”. If satisàable,
then the policy p and network topology twill not drop every packet thatA sends toB. More generally, we can
ask if a set of packets satisfying some predicate a—e.g., all packets located at a speciàed group of hosts, or all
packets of a certain type—can transition to a state where they satisfy some predicate b.
To reason about reachability, however, we need a slightly different model of our network. Speciàcally, we
want to be able to observe the packet at each step that it takes through the network. To model hop-by-hop
processing through a network, we use a policy of the form:
in; dup; (p; t; dup)*; out
Here the packet state is recorded on entry to the network and after every hop. In particular, this model
distinguishes between switch policies that forward all packets to the same network egresses, but do so along
different paths.
Now that we can observe the packet and build up a suitable hop-by-hop packet history, we deàne reacha-
bility as follows:
Deànition 1 (Reachability). We say b is reachable from a if and only if there exists a trace hpk1;    ; pkni 2
rng(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) such that JaK hpkni = fhpknig and JbK hpk1i = fhpk1ig.
To decide if b is reachable from awe need only determine the validity of the following Net equation:
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6 drop
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Intuitively, the expression dup; (p; t; dup)* denotes the set of all histories generated by the policy and topology.
Preàxing this set with a and postàxing it with b àlters the set to histories that begin with packets satisfying a
and endwith packets satisfying b. Wewould like to show that this equation corresponds to the semantic notion
of reachability in Deànition 1. The key to the proof is to translate both the denotational deànition of reachability
and the above equation into the language model, where they are easy to relate to one another.
Theorem 4 (Reachability Correctness). For predicates a and b, policy p, and topology t, a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6 drop,
if and only if b is reachable from a.
Proof. First we translate the Net term into the language model:
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6 drop
) 9n   1;
;n; dup;    ; dup;1 2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)
We also translate each term in the semantic deànition of reachability into the language model:
9pk1    pkn:
hpk1;    ; pkni 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K);JaK hpkni = fhpknig andJbK hpk1i = fhpk1ig
) 901   0m:
0m ;
0
m; dup;    ; dup;01 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*);
0m ;
0




Next, we prove each direction by setting  = n andm = n. For example, for soundness we need to show:
;n; dup;    ; dup;1 2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)
) 0m ;0m; dup;    ; dup;01 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)
This holds by the deànition of . Completeness is similar.
Waypointing. Another important kind of reachability property is waypointing. Intuitively, waypointing
properties ensure that every packet traverses a speciàed node such as a àrewall or intrusion-detection mid-
dlebox. More formally, we say that W is a waypoint from A to B if all paths from A to B go through W .
Phrased in terms of the denotational semantics,W is a waypoint if, for all histories whereB occurs afterA,W
appears between A and B.
Deànition 2 (Waypoint). For predicates a, b, and w, packets from a to b are waypointed through w if and only if for
all packet histories hpk1    pkni 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) where JaK hpkni = fhpknig and JbK hpk1i = fhpk1ig,
there exists pkx 2 hpk1    pkni such that JwK hpkxi = fhpkxig and for all i where 1 < i < x, we have JbK pk i = fg,
and for all i where x < i < n, we have JaK pk i = fg.
We can decide if w is a waypoint between a and b by checking the following Net equation:
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b
The left-hand side of this relation is exactly reachability. The right-hand side splits the network expression into
two pieces—the àrst ensures that packets do not prematurely visit b before the waypoint, w, and the second
ensures that packets do not return to a after the waypoint, if they are going to evetually reach b.
To prove the test sound and complete, we again translate both the test and the denotational semantics into










Figure 6. A simple network controlled by two parties.
Theorem 5 (Waypoint Correctness). For predicates a, b, and w,
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b
if and only if all packets from a to b are waypointed through w.
Proof. The proof is similar to the reachability proof above. Complete proofs of each direction are included in
the long version of this paper.
Using these encodings and theorems as building blocks, we can write reachability-checking equations for
other properties as well. For example, we can check for self-loops, test a àrewall, and even string together
multiple waypoints into composite tests.
6. Trafàc Isolation
Net’s policy combinators help programmers construct rich network policies out of simpler parts. The most
obvious combinator is parallel composition, which combines two smaller policies into one that, intuitively,
provides the “union” of both behaviors. But naive use of parallel composition can lead to undesirable results
due to interference between the packets generated by each sub-policy.
Example. Consider the network in Figure 6. Now, suppose the task of routing trafàc between hosts 1 and 2
has been assigned to one programmer, while the task of routing trafàc between hosts 3 and 4 has been assigned
to another programmer. The àrst programmer might produce the following policy for switch B,
pB1 , sw = B; (pt = 1; pt 2 + pt = 2; pt 1)
and the other programmer might produce a similar switch policy for B. This second policy differs from the
àrst only by sending trafàc from port 1 out port 3 rather than port 2:
pB2 , sw = B; (pt = 1; pt 3 + pt = 3; pt 1)
Similar policies pA1 and pA2 deàne the behavior at switch A. Assume a topology assertion t that captures the
topology of the network. By itself, the program
((pA1 + pB1); t)*
correctly sends trafàc from host 1 to host 2. But when the second policy is added in,
(((pA1 + pB1) + (pA2 + pB2)); t)*
packets sent from host 1will be copied to host 4 as well as host 2. In this instance, parallel composition actually
produces too many behaviors. In the best case, sending additional packets to host 4 from host 1 leads to network
congestion. In the worst case, it may violate the security policy for host 1. Either case demonstrates the need
for better ways of composing forwarding policies.
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Slices. A network slice [8] is a lightweight abstraction that facilitates modular construction of routing policies.
Intuitively, a slice deànes a piece of the network that may be programmed independently. A slice comes with
ingress (in) and egress (out) predicates, which deàne its boundaries, as well as an internal policy p. Packets
that match in are injected into the slice. Once in a slice, packets stay in the slice and obey p until they match
the predicate out, at which point they are ejected. We write slices as follows:
fing w : (p) foutg
where in and out are the ingress and egress predicates and p deànes the internal policy. Each slice also has a
unique identiàer w to differentiate it from other slices in a network program.2
It is easy to deàne slices by elaboration into Net. We àrst create a new header àeld tag to record the slice
to which the packet currently belongs.3 In order for our elaboration to have the desired properties, however,
the tag àeld must not be used elsewhere in the policy or in the ingress or egress predicates. We call a predicate
tag-free if it commutes with any modiàcation of the tag àeld, and a policy tag-free if it commutes with any test
of the tag àeld.
Given tag-free predicates in, out and policy p, and a tag w0 representing packets not in any slice, we can
compile a slice into Net as follows:
Lfing w : (p) foutgMw0 ,
let pre = (tag = w0; in; tag  w + tag = w) in
let post = (out; tag  w0 + :out) in
(pre; p; post)
Slice compilation wraps the slice policy with pre- and post-processing policies, pre and post. The pre policy
tests whether a packet (i) is outside the slice (tagged with w0) and matches the ingress predicate, in which
case it is injected by tagging it with w, or (ii) has already been injected (already tagged with w). Once injected,
packets are processed by p. If p emits a packet that matches the egress predicate out, then post strips the tag,
restoring w0. Otherwise, the packet remains in the slice and is left unmodiàed.
Isolation. A key property of slices is that once a packet enters a slice, it is processed solely by the slice policy
until it is ejected, even across multiple hops in the topology.
Theorem 6 (Slice/Slice Composition). For all tag-free slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, identi-
àers w1; w2, policies s1; s2, tag-free policies p1; p2, and topologies t, such that
• s1 = Lfin1g w1 : (p1) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2 = Lfin2g w2 : (p2) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2, w1 6= w0, w2 6= w0
• H1: out1; t; dup; in2  drop, and
• H2: out2; t; dup; in1  drop, then
((s1 + s2); t; dup)*  (s1; t; dup)* + (s2; t; dup)*.
If the preconditions are met, including that the two slices have different identiàers and that the slice
boundaries are disjoint, then the theorem says that pushing a packet through a network executing s1 and
s2 in parallel is the same as copying that packet and pushing it through two separate copies the network,
each containing one of the slices. The proof of the theorem is by equational reasoning and makes use of the
KAT-D (see Figure 3).
An interesting corollary of the result above is that when the slice boundaries between s1 and s2 do not
overlap, and one restricts attention to trafàc destined for the ingress of s1, running s1 in parallel with s2 is
equivalent to running s1 alone.
2The unique identiàer w may be deàned by the compiler and need not actually appear in the surface syntax.
3 In practice, the vlan àeld is often used to differentiate different classes of network trafàc [31].
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Corollary 1. For all tag-free slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, identiàers w1; w2, policies s1; s2,
tag-free policies p1; p2, and topologies t, such that
• s1 = Lfin1g w1 : (p1) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2 = Lfin2g w2 : (p2) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2, w1 6= w0, w2 6= w0
• H1: out1; t; dup; in2  drop,
• H2: out2; t; dup; in1  drop,
• H3: in1; in2  drop, then
in1; tag = w0; ((s1 + s2); t; dup)*
 in1; tag = w0; (s1; t; dup)*
Looking closely at Corollary 1, one can see a connection to traditional language-based information áow
properties [25]. Think of s1 as deàning the public, low-security data and s2 as deàning the private, high security
data. Under this interpretation, observable behavior of the network remains unchanged regardless of whether
the high-security data (s2) is present or replaced by some alternate high security data (s02).
Example, redux. Slices provide a solution to the scenario described in the example at the beginning of the
section. We can assign each programmer a unique slice with boundaries that correspond to the locations of
the end hosts under control of that slice. For instance, the àrst programmer’s in and out predicates include
the network access points for hosts 1 and 2, while the second programmer’s in and out predicates include the
network access points for hosts 3 and 4.
in1 = sw = A; pt = 1 + sw = B; pt = 2
out1 = sw = A; pt = 1 + sw = B; pt = 2
s1 = fin1g w1 : (pA1 + pB1) fout1g
in2 = sw = A; pt = 3 + sw = B; pt = 3
out2 = sw = A; pt = 3 + sw = B; pt = 3
s2 = fin2g w2 : (pA2 + pB2) fout2g
The original difàculty with this examplemanifested as packet duplication when a packet was sent from host
1 to host 2. Corollary 1 shows that slices solve the problem: host 1 is connected to slice 1, and restricting the
input to that of slice 1 implies that the behavior of the entire program is precisely that of slice 1 alone.
7. Compilation
Amajor challenge for the designers of network programming languages is compiling their high-level abstrac-
tions to the low-level operations that network hardware supports. For example, OpenFlow switches use a áow
table of rules to process packets. Because Net supports richer expressions than OpenFlow, we must design
compilation algorithms to “áatten” Net policies into OpenFlow rule tables.
Other network programming languages have compilation algorithmswith proofs of correctness [5, 7, 22, 29]
that painstakingly relate their high-level semantics with the low-level semantics of OpenFlow rules. We take
a different approach that allows us to fully exploit our equational theory: we deàne a syntactic restriction of
Net based on OpenFlow tables, which we call OpenFlow Normal Form (ONF) and then prove by induction
(using purely syntactic arguments) that Net can be normalized to ONF.
The inductive proof is lengthy and relegated to the long version of this paper. A particularly challenging
aspect of compilation is proving that sequential composition can be normalized: in an OpenFlow rule table
(and thus inONF) tests cannot be applied after actions. Therefore, we have to rewrite Net terms by carefully
applying the commutativity axioms. This section highlights some of the important steps that enable the
inductive normalization proof. The inductive proof can also be interpreted as a recursive function that compiles
Net to OpenFlow Normal Form.
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ONF Action Sequence a ::= id j f  n; a
ONF Action Sum as ::= drop j a+ as
ONF Predicate b ::= id j f = n; b
ONF Local ` ::= as j if b then as else `
ONF p ::= drop j (sw = sw; `) + p
Figure 7. OpenFlow Normal Form.
OpenFlow Normal Form (ONF). An OpenFlow switch processes a packet using a table of prioritized rules. In
essence, each rule has a bit-pattern with wildcards to match packets and a list of actions to apply to packets
that match the pattern. If a packet matches several rules, only the highest-priority rule is applied.
Instead of compilingNet to rule tables directly,we deàneONF, a syntactic subset ofNet that translates
almost directly to rule tables. An ONF term is a sum of policies, where each sub-term is predicated on a switch
number:
sw = sw1; `1 +   + sw = swn; `n
Above, `1    `n are policies that do not test or modify the switch. Therefore, each of these policies can be run
locally on a switch. These switch-local policies are syntactically restricted to a shape that resembles a rule table.
Each is a cascade of if-then-else expressions, where the conditionals are a conjunction of positive literals. Note
that if-then-else is simple syntactic sugar:
if b then as else `
def
= (b; as) + (:b; `)
A policy p is in Openáow Normal Form (p 2 ONF) when it satisàes the grammar in Figure 7 and includes no
occurrences of the àeld sw. Note that ONF excludes expressions that modify the switch or contain dup. These
operations are meaningless on a switch: only the topology can update switch numbers, and dup only exists to
enable equational reasoning about packet histories.
7.1 Compiling to ONF.
This section steps through a sequence of proofs that transform switch policies to ONF. Each proof eliminates or
restricts an element of Net syntax. In other words, each lemma translates from one intermediate represen-
tation to another, until we arrive at low-level ONF. As a naming convention, we writeNet (op), where op
to stand for Net expressions that do not use the op operator. For example, if:
p 2 Net (dup;sw )
then p does not contain dup and does not modify the switch àeld (i.e., p is a switch policy).
Step 1: star elimination. The àrst step is to eliminate Kleene star from the input policy. This step is critical as
switches do not support iterated processing of packets—indeed, many switches only support a single phase of
processing by a table! Formally, we prove any program without dup, or, less importantly, assignment to sw, is
equivalent to a Kleene star-free program (again without the dup primitive or assignments to sw).
Lemma 7 (Star Elimination). If p 2 Net (dup;sw ), then there exists p0 2 Net (dup;sw ;) and p  p0.
Proof. The proof begins by showing that p0 can be obtained from the normal form used in the completeness
theorem.More speciàcally, let p00 be the policy obtained from p by the normalization construction of lemma4. By
construction, dup can only appear in the normal formof an expression already containing dup, therefore p00 does
not contain dup. Moreover, R(p00)  I and p00 does not contain dup, therefore R(p00)  At;P . Consequently,
p00 does not contain Kleene star.
Let us now prove that any assignment of the form sw  swi in p00 is preceded in the same term by the
corresponding test sw = swi. Because p does not contain any assignment of the form sw  sw i, it commutes
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with any test of the form sw = sw i, and therefore p00 also commutes with any test of the form sw = sw i. p00
can be written as a sum of ;p for some atoms  and complete assignments p. Suppose for a contradiction that
term,  contains a test sw = sw i, and p contains an assignment sw  sw j , with sw i 6= sw j . Then
; (sw = sw i); p
00; (sw = sw j)  ; p 6= 0
; (sw = sw j); p
00; (sw = sw i) = 0
but those two terms are also equal, which is a contradiction.
Therefore any assignment of the form sw  swi in p00 is preceded, in the same term, by the corresponding
test sw = swi, and can be removed using axiom PA-F-M to produce the desired p0. Tests and assignments
to other àelds than sw could appear in between, but we can use the commutativity axioms PA-M-M-C
and PA-M-F-C to move the assignment sw  swi to just after the test sw = swi.
Step 2: switch specialization. Next, we show that it is possible to specialize star-free policies to each switch
and remove nested tests of the switch àeld sw. This puts the policy into a form where it can readily compiled
to local conàgurations for each switch.
Lemma 8 (Switch Specialization). If p 2 Net (dup;sw ;), then for all switches sw i, there exists p0 2
Net (dup;sw ;;sw) such that sw = sw i; p  sw = sw i; p0.
Proof. Let g be the unique homomorphism of Net deàned on primitive programs by:
g(sw = sw) ,
(
id if sw = sw i
drop otherwise
g(f  v) , f  v
g(dup) , dup
For every primitive program element x of Net (dup;sw ;), we have both:
sw = sw i;x  g(x); sw = sw i
g(x); sw = sw i  sw = sw i; g(x)
Hence, applying Lemma 4.4 in [2] twice shows:
sw = sw i; p  g(p); sw = sw i
g(p); sw = sw i  sw = sw i; g(p)
By the deànition of g, any occurrence of sw = v in p is replaced by either id or drop in g(p). Moreover,
since p 2 Net (dup;sw ;), it follows that g(p) does not contain any occurrence of sw = v and since
p0 = g(p) 2 Net (dup;sw ;;sw) we also have
sw = sw i; p  sw = sw i; p0
Step 3: Converting toONF. Third, we show any policy in Net (dup;sw ;;sw) can be transformed in toONF.
Lemma 9 (Switch-local Compilation).
If p 2 Net (dup;sw ;*;sw) then there exists a policy p0 such that p  p0 and p0 2 ONF:
The proof goes by induction on the structure of p.
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Step 4: combining results. Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 sufàce to prove any policy p in Net (dup;sw ) may be
converted to OpenFlow normal form.
Theorem 7 (ONF). If pin 2 Net (dup;sw ), then there exists pout  pin such that pout 2 ONF.
Optimizations. Naive compilation of network programs can produce switch rule tables that are unmanage-
ably large [22]. Hence, existing systems implement optimizations to generate smaller tables. For example, the
following lemma describes a common optimization called fall-through elimination.
Lemma 10 (Fall-through Elimination). If b1  b2 then if b1 then as else if b2 then as else `  if b2 then as else ` .
This transformation removes an unnecessary rule from a table.
8. Related Work
Kleene algebra is named for its inventor, Stephen Cole Kleene. Much of the basic algebraic theory of  was
developed by John Horton Conway [4]. Kleene algebra with tests was introduced by Kozen [13, 14].  and
 have been successfully applied in many practical veriàcation tasks, including veriàcation of compiler
optimizations [16], pointer analysis [21], concurrency control [3], and device drivers [15]. This is the àrst time
 has been used as a network programming language or applied to veriàcation of networks. The proof of the
main result in this paper—completeness of the equational axioms—is based on a novel model of .
While many other systems have been proposed for analyzing networks, we believe ours is the àrst to
provide a complete, high-level algebra for reasoning about network programs as they are written. Systems
such as Anteater [19], FlowChecker [1], Header Space Analysis [10], Veriáow [11], and Formally Veriàable
Networking [30], encode information about network topology and forwarding policies into SAT formulae
(Anteater), graph-based representations (Veriáow, Header Space Analysis), or higher-order logic (Formally
Veriàable Networking). These systems then deàne custom algorithms over these models to check speciàc
properties such as reachability or packet loss. Such systems can check for violations of important network
invariants, but do not provide sound and complete systems for reasoning directly about programs. Moreover,
although these systems have expressive languages for encodingproperties, they donot connect these encodings
back to denotational or operational models of the network. In contrast, in section 5, we show how to encode
a reachability property as a Net equation and then prove that the reachability equation is equivalent to a
semantic deànition of reachability.
As a programming language, Net ismost similar toNetCore [7, 22] and Pyretic [23], which both stemmed
from earlier work on Frenetic [6]. NetCore deàned the fragment of Net that included parallel composition
and Pyretic extended NetCore with sequential composition, though Pyretic gave neither a formal semantics
nor a compiler. Neither system deàned an equational theory for reasoning about programs, nor did it include
Kleene star—unlike these previous languages, Net programs can describe potentially inànite behaviors.
NDLog [18] is a logic programming language with an explicit notion of location and a distributed execution
model. In contrast to NDLog, Net andNetCore are designed for programming centralized (not distributed)
SDN controllers. Because NDLog is based around Datalog (with general recursion and pragmatic extensions
that complicate its semantics), equivalence of NDLog programs is undecidable [27]. Net’s Kleene star is
able to model network behavior, but has decidable (-complete) equivalence.
9. Conclusion
This paper deànes Net, a language for programming and reasoning about networks that is based on a solid
semantic foundation—Kleene algebrawith tests. Net’s denotational semantics describes network programs
as functions from packet histories to sets of packets histories and its equational theory is sound and complete
with respect to this model. The language enables programmers to create expressive, compositional network
programs and reason effectively about their semantics. We demonstrate the power of our framework on a
range of practical applications including reachability, trafàc isolation, access control, and compiler correctness.
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This appendix presents additional details of the lemmas and theorems in the main body of the paper.
A. Soundness and Completeness
This section presents details of the proofs and supporting lemmas of the theorems in Section 4.
A.1 Relational Semantics
For soundness, it is helpful to reformulate the standard packet-history semantics introduced in §3 in terms of
binary relations. In the standard semantics, policies and predicates are modeled as functions JpK : H! P(H),
whereH is the set of packet histories andP(H) denotes the powerset ofH. Intuitively, JpK takes an input packet
history h and produces a set of output packet histories JpK (h) in response.
Formally, the maps JpK : H ! P(H) are morphisms of type H ! H in KlP , the Kleisli category of the
powerset monad. Composition in a Kleisli category of a monad is called Kleisli composition. For the powerset
monad, it is deàned as: Jp; qK = JpK . JqK = h :[JqK (h 0) j h 0 2 JpK (h)	:
The identity morphisms are JidK = h :fhg.
We can lift JpK to L JpK : P(H)! P(H) by:
L JpK (A) =[ fJpK (h) j h 2 Ag :
Intuitively, given a set of input packet histories A  H, L JpK produces a set of output packet histories by
applying JpK to each element of A individually and accumulating the results. This is just the familiar subset
construction of automata theory.
The lifting functorL embeds the Kleisli categoryKlP faithfully, but not fully, in the category Set of sets and
set functions. Thus
L Jp; qK (A) = L JqK (L JpK (A)) L JidK (A) = A:
It is well known that the Kleisli category KlP is isomorphic to the category Rel of sets and binary relations.
This is simply a matter of currying:
X ! P(Y ) = X ! Y ! 2 = X  Y ! 2 = P(X  Y ):
The isomorphismgives an equivalent view of the semantics inwhich each policy and predicate is interpreted
as a binary relation [p]  H H:
(h1; h2) 2 [p] , h2 2 JpK (h1):
In relational models, product is ordinary relational composition
[p; q] = [p]  [q] = f(h1; h2) j 9h3 (h1; h3) 2 [p] ^ (h3; h2) 2 [q]g
with identity [id] = f(h; h) j h 2 Hg. The remaining  operations +, *, drop, and : translate under the
isomorphism to the usual  operations on binary relations
[p+ q] = [p] [ [q] [p*] =
[
n0
[pn] [drop] = ; [:b] = [id] n [b]:
The relation [p*] is the reáexive transitive closure of [p]. For every predicate b, by deànition there existsB  H
such that
JbK = h :(fhg h 2 B; h 62 B [b] = f(h; h) j h 2 Bg
in the Kleisli and relational view, respectively. Intuitively, the packet is passed through unaltered if it passes
the test b and dropped if not. The Boolean operations on tests are the usual set-theoretic ones.
Since relational models with these distinguished operations satisfy the axioms of  (see e.g. [14, 17]), so
do Net models with the packet-history semantics of §3.
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A.2 Soundness
Theorem 1 (Soundness). The  axioms with the equational premises of Figure 2 are sound with respect to the semantics
of Section 3. That is, if ` p  q, then JpK = JqK.
Proof. Wehave already argued that any packet historymodel is isomorphic to a relational , therefore satisàes
all the axioms of  in àg. 2.
It remains to show that the specializedNet axioms on are satisàed. These can all be veriàed by elementary
arguments in relation algebra (see e.g. [26]). Some are special cases of [2, Equations (6)–(11)], whose soundness
is proved in [2, Theorem 4.3].
• (PA-O-F-C) Jdup; f = nK = Jf = n; dupK.
In terms of relational algebra, we must argue that
[dup]  [f = n] = [f = n]  [dup]:
The dup operation duplicates the head packet in the packet history. Since the new head packet is identical
to the old, any test on the head packet will yield the same truth value before and after the dup; thus [dup]
respects the partitionB; B, that is, [dup]  (BB)[( B B), whereB is the domain of [f = n]. It follows
from relation algebra that
[f = n]  [dup] = [dup]  [f = n] = [dup] \ (B B):
• (PA-M-M) Jf  n1; f  n2K = Jf  n2K.
This is a special case of [2, Equation (8)]. Intuitively, an assignment to f immediately followed by another
assignment to f has the same effect as if the àrst assignment was never done.
• (PA-M-M-C)Jf1  n1; f2  n2K = Jf2  n2; f1  n1K, where f1 6= f2.
This is a special case of [2, Equation (10)]. Intuitively, assignments to different àelds can be done in either
order.
• (PA-M-F) Jf  n; f = nK = Jf  nK.
This is a special case of [2, Equation (9)] (allowing the universally true test n = n). Intuitively, assigning n
to f makes the test f = n true.
• (PA-M-F-C)Jf1  n1; f2 = n2K = Jf2 = n2; f1  n1K, where f1 6= f2.
This is a special case of [2, Equation (11)]. Intuitively, an assignment to a àeld does not affect the value of
another àeld.
• (PA-F-M) Jf = n; f  nK = Jf = nK.
Relationally, [f = n]  [f  n] = [f = n]. This is true because the assignment [f  n] acts as the identity
on the codomain of [f = n]. Intuitively, if the value of f is already n, there is no need to assign it again.
• (PA-C)Jf = n1; f = n2K = JdropK, where n1 6= n2.
Equivalently, [f = n1]  [f = n2] = ;. This is true because the codomain of [f = n1] and the domain of
[f = n2] are disjoint. Intuitively, no packet can have two distinct values for f .
• (PA-M-A) JPn f = nK = JidK.
Equivalently,
S
n [f = n] = H. This is true because the domains of [f = n], accumulated over all possible
values n for the àeld f , exhaust H. Intuitively, every packet has a value for f .
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A.3 Completeness
Lemma 1. For all reduced policies p, we have JpK = Sx2G(p) JxK.
Proof. By structural induction on p. For the basis,










JK = J;K = [
x2G()
JxK ;







J; ; dup;K = [
x2G(dup)
JxK :
For the induction step,






















































Lemma 2. If x; y 2 I , then JxK = JyK if and only if x = y.
Proof. If x = ;0; dup;    ; dup;n and h is any single packet satisfying , then JxK (h) = fh 0g, where h 0
consists of n+1 packets satisfying0 ; : : : ; n in chronological order. The only string in I that could produce
this h 0 from h is x. Thus x is uniquely determined by JxK.
Lemma 3. For all reduced Net policies p and q, we have JpK = JqK if and only ifG(p) = G(q).
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Proof. Using Lemma 2,








JxK (h)  [
y2G(q)
JyK (h)
) 8h 8x 2 G(p) JxK (h)  [
y2G(q)
JyK (h)
) 8h 8x 2 G(p) 9y 2 G(q) JxK (h)  JyK (h)
) 8x 2 G(p) 9y 2 G(q) x = y
) G(p)  G(q);
and similarly for the reverse inclusion. The converse follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. Every policy is normalizable.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of policies. To begin, the primitive symbols are normal-
izable:
h n  P2At ;0
dup  P2At ; ; dup;
b  Pb ;
Next, we show that sums and products of normalizable expressions are normalizable. The case for sums is


















si  tj :
The most interesting case is for Kleene star. Consider an expression p*, where p is in normal form. We àrst
prove the uniform case: when all guarded terms in the sum p have the same initial atom , that is, p = ; t
where t is a sum of terms each with a leading and trailing , andR(t)  P ; (dup;P )*. Let u be twith all terms
whose trailing  is not  deleted and with the trailing  deleted from all remaining terms. By the simpliàed
axioms of Figure 5, we have t;; t  u; t, therefore t;; t;  u; t;. Using [2, Lemma 4.4],
(t;)*; t  t+ t;; (t;)*; t
 t+ u*; t;; t
 t+ u*;u; t
 u*; t;
and hence
p*  id+ p*; p
 id+ (; t)*;; t
 id+ ; (t;)*; t
 id+ ;u*; t
 id+ ; t+ ;u;u*; t;
which after normalizing the id is in normal form.
Finally, for the case p* where the initial tests in the sum p are not uniform, the argument is by induction on
the number of terms in the sum. If p = ;x + q, then by induction hypothesis, q* has an equivalent normal
form q^*. Using KAT-D (Figure 3), we obtain
p*  (;x+ q)*  q*; (;x; q*)*  q^*; (;x; q^*)*;















and similarly for  and dup. For the induction step,


























































Lemma 6. IfR(p)  I , thenR(p) = G(p).








Theorem 2 (Completeness). Every semantically equivalent pair of expressions is provably equivalent in Net. That is,
if JpK = JqK, then ` p  q.
Proof. Let p^ and q^ be the normal forms of p and q. By Lemma 4,we can prove that each is equivalent to its normal
form: ` p  p^ and ` q  q^. By soundness we have JpK = Jp^K and JqK = Jq^K. Hence Jp^K = Jq^K by transitivity.
By Lemma 3, we have G(p^) = G(q^). Moreover, by Lemma 6, we have G(p^) = R(p^) and G(q^) = R(q^), thus
R(p^) = R(q^) by transitivity. Since R(p^) and R(q^) are regular sets, by the completeness of , we also have
` p^  q^. Finally, as` p  p^ and` q  q^ and` p^  q^, by transitivitywe conclude that` p  q, as required.
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Syntax
Atoms ;  , f1 = n1;    ; fk = nk
Assignments  , f1  n1;    ; fk  nk
Join-irreducibles x; y 2 At ; (P ; dup)*;P
Simpliàed axioms for At and P




  ; ;0  0 ;  drop;  6= 
Join-irreducible concatenation
; p;  ; q;0 =
(
; p; q;0 if  = 
undeàned if  6= 
A  B = fp  q j p 2 A; q 2 Bg  I
Regular Interpretation: R(p)  (P +At + dup)*
R() = fg
R(p+ q) = R(p) [R(q)
R() = fg






with p0 = 1 and pn+1 = p; pn
Language Model:G(p)  I = At ; (P ; dup)*;P
G() = f; j  2 Atg
G(p+ q) = G(p) [G(q)
G() = f;g
G(p; q) = G(p)  G(q)





Figure 5. Completeness deànitions.
A.4 Decidability
Theorem 3. The equational theory of Net is -complete.
Proof sketch. To show -hardness, reduce  to Net as follows. Let be a ànite alphabet. For a regular
expression e over , let R(e) be the regular set of strings over  as deàned in §4. Transform e to a Net
expression e0 by replacing each occurrence in e of a symbol p 2  with (p; dup) and prepending with an
arbitrary but àxed atom . It follows from Lemmas 3 and 6 that R(e1) = R(e2) if and only if R(e01) = R(e02)
if and only ifG(e01) = G(e02) if and only if Je01K = Je02K.
To show that the problem is in , given two Net expressions e1 and e2, we know that Je1K 6= Je2K
if and only if there is a packet pk and packet history h such that h 2 Je1K (pk) n Je2K (pk) or h 2 Je2K (pk) nJe1K (pk); let us say the former without loss of generality. We guess pk nondeterministically and follow a
nondeterministically-guessed trajectory through e1 that produces some h 2 Je1K (pk). At the same time, we
trace all possible trajectories through e2 that could generate a preàx of h, ensuring that none of these produce
h 2 Je2K. It takes only polynomial space to represent the current values of the àelds of the head packet and
the possible positions in e2 for the current preàx of h. The algorithm is nondeterministic, but can be made
deterministic using Savitch’s theorem.
B. Application: Reachability
This section contains the full proofs and supporting lemmas for the theorems in Section 5. Figure 5 summarizes
many of the deànitions used here. Recall that atoms and complete assignments are in a one-to-one correspon-
dence according to the values n. Hence, if  is a complete assignment, wewrite to denote the corresponding
atom, and if  is an atom, then  denotes the corresponding complete assignment.
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We can also see a close correspondence between join-irreducible terms in the language model and traces in
the denotational semantics. For example, consider a Net program p and a trace [pkn    pk1] 2 rng( JpK).
The trace corresponds to a join-irreducible term ;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(p), where each complete
assignment pkk is responsible for assigning the values that lead to the observation of pkk in the trace.
Lemma 11 (Remember First Hop). If ;pkn ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) then  = pkn .
Proof.
Assertion Reasoning
;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) Hypothesis
;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(dup)  G((p; t; dup)*) By deànition of 
;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn = 0;0pk1 ; dup  0; I By deànition ofG(dup)
0pk1 = pk1 By deànition of 
;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn = pk1 ;pk1 ; dup;pk1  pk1 ; I by deànition ofG(dup)
Goal  = pk1 Immediate
Lemma12 (Range to Language). If [pkn    pk1] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) then9:;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2
G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)
Proof.
Assertion Reasoning
[pkn    pk1] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) Hypothesis
9h[pkn    pk1] 2 Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K h Deànition of range
[pkn    pk1] 2 (
S
x2G(dup;(p;t;dup)*) JxK) h Lemma 1
Therefore there exists an0, such that0;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) and [pkn    pk1] 2q
0;pkm1 ; dup    dup; pkmn
y
h .
We show that  = 0 and [pkmn    pkm1] = [pkn    pk1]. Since we have 0;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn 2
G(dup; (p; t; dup)*), this will be enough to establish the goal.
Case 1: h = [pkx].
Assertion Reasoning
[pkn    pk1]
=
q
;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
y
[pkx]
= JK . qpkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmny [pkx] by function composition
=
q
pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
y




y . q   dup;pkmny [pkx] by function composition
=
q   dup;pkmny [pkm1 pkm1] by deànition of dup and assignment





[pkmn 1 pkmn 1    pkm1] by deànition of dup and assignment
= [pkmn pkmn 1 pkmn 1    pkm1] by deànition of assignment
Case 2: h has more than 1 element. Because join-irreducible elements alternate between dup and modiàcations,
the lengths of the lists are different, hence we have a contradiction.
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Lemma 13 (Linguistic Test). JpK [pk ] = f[pk ]g, if and only if pk ;pk 2 G(p)
Proof.
Assertion ReasoningJpK hpki = fhpkig
() Sx2G(p) JxK hpki = fhpkig by lemma 1
() q;pk0 ; dup    dup;pkny hpki = fhpkig


















y hpki = fhpkig matching test




y hpki = fhpkig by .
pk ;pk 2 G(p)
Theorem 7 (Reachability). For predicates a and b, policy p, and topology t,
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6= 0
if, and only if, there exists pk1    pkn such that
• [pk1    pkn] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K), and
• JaK [pkn] = f[pkn]g, and
• JbK [pk1] = f[pk1]g.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that all tests and assignments are complete.
Direction).
Assertion Reasoning
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6= 0 Hypothesis
= Ja; dup; (p; t; dup)*; bK 6= J0K Theorem 1
= G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b) 6= G(0) Lemma 3
9; pk0 ;    ; pkm where
;pk0   pkm 2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)
Let pk1 = pkm ,    ; and pkn = pk0 , and let  = pkn . We must satisfy three goals:
G1. JaK [pkn] = f[pkn]g
G2. JbK [pk1] = f[pk1]g
G3. [pkk    pk0] 2 rngJdup; (p; t; dup)*K
We can rewrite our hypothesis in terms of pk00 ; : : : ;pkm0 :
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Assertion Reasoning
pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 ;2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)
= pkn ;pkn  pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1  pk1 ;pk1
2 G(a)  G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)  G(b) By .
Hence, our hypothesis is comprised of three components:
• H1. pkn ;pkn 2 G(a)
• H2. pk1 ;pk1 2 G(b)
• H3. pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)
G1 and G2. Both goals G1 and G2 follow from Lemma 13, H1, and H2.
G3.
Assertion Reasoning
[pkk    pk0] 2 rngJdup; (p; t; dup)*K
) 9; ;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) By Range to Language (Lemma 12).
) pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) By Remember First Hop (Lemma 11).
The goal G3 then follows from H3.
Direction(. We have that there exist pk1    pkn such that the following hypotheses hold.
• H: [pk1    pkn] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K)
• H0: JaK [pkn] = f[pkn]g
• H1: JbK [pk1] = f[pk1]g
We must show that
Goal: a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; ; b 6= drop
Assertion Reasoning
[pk1    pkn] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) H.
) 9:;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) By Range to Language (Lemma 12).
) pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*) By Remember First Hop (Lemma 11).
JaK [pkn] = f[pkn]g H0.
) pkn ;pkn 2 G(a) By Linguistic Test (Lemma 13).
JbK [pk1] = f[pk1]g H1.
) pk1 ;pk1 2 G(b) By Linguistic Test (Lemma 13).
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b 6= drop Goal.
) G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b) 6= fg By Theorem 2
) 90;pkj ; dup    dup;pkk
2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; ; b) By the meaning of 6= fg.
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Let 0;pkj ; dup   pkk = pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 . After substitution, we have:
Assertion Reasoning
pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 2 G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; ; b)
= pkn ;pkn  pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1  pk1 ;pk1
2 G(a)  G(dup; (p; t; dup)*; )  G(b) By the deànition of .
Hence, our goal is comprised of three subgoals.
• G1: pkn ;pkn 2 G(a)
• G2: pkn ;pkn ; dup   pk1 ;2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*; )
• G3: pk1 ;pk1 2 G(b)
Subgoal G1 follows from H0, while G2 follows from H1, and G3 follows from H.
Lemma 14 (Language to Applied Policy). If pk ;pk  G(p) = pk ;pk  G(q) then for all h , JpK [pk :: h] =JqK [pk :: h].




JxK [pk :: h] = [
y2G(q)
JyK [pk :: h]
The proof proceeds by cases on the value of x.
Case 1: x = pk ;pk ; dup;pkm   pkn . Our goal is now to show:
pk ;pk ; dup;pkm   pkn ;2
[
y2G(q)
JyK [pk :: h]
From the hypothesis, we know:
pk ;pk  x = pk ;pk  G(q)
Therefore x = G(q).
Case 2: x 6= pk ;pk ; dup;pkm   pkn . It follows from the value of x and the deànition of the denotational
semantics that: JxK [pk :: h] = fg
Hence, the following is undeàned:
pk ;pk  G(p)
It then follows from the hypothesis that the following is also undeàned:
pk ;pk  G(q)
Therefore: JyK [pk :: h] = fg
This satisàes our goal.
Lemma 15 (Pass the Test). If pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((p; t; dup)n) and for all i, pki ;pk i 2 G(a),
then pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(a; (p; t; dup)n).
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on n.
Base case: n = 0. H: pk1 ;pk2 2 G(1). Contradiction.
Inductive case. We have the following hypotheses:
• H1: pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((p; t; dup)n)
• H2: for all i, pki ;pk i 2 G(a)
• IH: pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 1 2 G(a; (p; t; dup)n 1)
Our goal is
pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(a; (p; t; dup)n)
We can rewrite the goal using :
Assertion Reasoning
pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 1  pkn 1 ;pkn 1 ; dup;pkn
2 G(a; (p; t; dup)n 1)  G(a; (p; t; dup)) By the deànition of .
Hence, our goal is comprised of two subgoals:
• G1: pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 1 2 G(a; (p; t; dup)n 1)
• G2: pkn 1 ;pkn 1 ; dup;pkn 2 G(a; (p; t; dup))
The subgoal G1 follows immediately from IH. Moving next to G2, we can again rewrite using .
Assertion Reasoning
pkn 1 ;pkn 1  pkn 1 ;pkn 1 ; dup;pkn
2 G(a)  G(p; t; dup) By the deànition of .
Hence, we again have two subgoals:
• G1’: pkn 1 ;pkn 1 2 G(a)
• G2’: pkn 1 ;pkn 1 ; dup;pkn 2 G(p; t; dup)
The subgoal G1’ follows immediately from H2. Next, note that we can rewrite H1 as follows:
pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 1  pkn 1 ;pkn 1 ; dup;pkn 2 G((p; t; dup)n 1)  G(p; t; dup)
The subgoal G2’ follows from H1.
Deànition 2 (Waypoint). For predicates a, b, and w, packets from a to b are waypointed through w if and only if for
all packet histories hpk1    pkni 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) where JaK hpkni = fhpknig and JbK hpk1i = fhpk1ig,
there exists pkx 2 hpk1    pkni such that JwK hpkxi = fhpkxig and for all i where 1 < i < x, we have JbK pk i = fg,
and for all i where x < i < n, we have JaK pk i = fg.
Theorem 2 (Waypointing). For all user policies p, topologies t, tests a and b, and waypointsw,w is a semantic waypoint
of p and t between a and b if, and only if,
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b
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Proof. We àrst unfold the deànition of waypoint in the theorem statement. We swap the order of the statement
for readability.
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b
if and only if, for all packet histories hpk1    pkni, if
• hpk1    pkni 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K),
• JaK hpkni = fhpknig, and
• JbK hpk1i = fhpk1ig
then there exists and x, such that
• pkx 2 hpk1    pkni,
• JwK hpkxi = fhpkxig,
• 8i:1 < i < x) JbK pk i = fg, and
• 8i:x < i < n) JaK pk i = fg
Direction(. We àrst simplify the goal as follows.
Assertion Reasoning
Goal: a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:b; p; t; dup)*; b
= 8[pk :: h]: Ja; dup; (p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h]
 Ja; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:b; p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h] by deànition of
( G(pk )  G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)
 G(pk )  G(a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:b; p; t; dup)*; b) by Lemma 14
= G(pk )  G(a)  G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)  G(b)
 G(pk )  G(a)  G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:b; p; t; dup)*)  G(b) by deànition of 
( G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)  G(dup; (:q; p; t; dup)*;w; (:q; p; t; dup)*) by deànition of 
= 8pkm1    pkmn:
;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*))
;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn 2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:b; p; t; dup)*) by deànition of
Case 1. [pk :: h] satisàes the conditions of Deànition 2. The hypotheses are thus:
H1. [pk :: h] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K)
H2. JaK [pk1] = f[pk1]g
H3. JbK [pkn] = f[pkn]g
H4. There exists an x, such that:
• 1 < x < n,
• JwK hpkxi = fhpkxig,
• 8i:1 < i < x JbK hpk ii = ;, and
• 8i:x < i < n JaK pkn = ;
H5. ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)
We can rewrite hypotheses 1-3 as follows:
H1’. pk1 ;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)*)
H2’. pk1 ;pk1 2 G(a)
H3’. pkn ;pkn 2 G(b)
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Transform the goal as follows:
Assertion Reasoning
;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*)
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)n1 ;w; (:a; p; t; dup)n2) 9n1; n2 by deànition of *
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)z;w; (:a; p; t; dup)n z) let z = n1 and by n1 + n2 = n
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz  pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)z)  G(w; (:a; p; t; dup)n z) by deànition of 
Transform H5 to H5’ as follows:
Assertion Reasoning
pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)n) by deànition of *, 9n
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz  pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)n) by deànition of 
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz  pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn
2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)z)  G(dup; (p; t; dup)n z) since z  n
Now we can deàne two subgoals:
G1. ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz 2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)z)
G2. pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn 2 G(w; (:a; p; t; dup)n z)
Proof of G1:
Assertion Reasoning
pkm1 ;pkm1 ; dup;pkm1  pkm1 ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz
2 G(dup)  G((p; t; dup)z) by H5’
) ;pkm1 ; dup;pkm1  ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz
2 G(dup)  G((:b; p; t; dup)z) by H4
) pkm1 ;pkm1 ; dup;pkm1  pkm1 ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz
2 G(dup)  G((:b; p; t; dup)z) by 
) ;pkm1 ; dup    dup;pkmz
2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)z) by 
Proof of G2:
Assertion Reasoning
pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn 2 G(dup; (p; t; dup)n z) by H5
pkmz ;pkmz    dup;pkmn 2 G(w; (:a; p; t; dup)n z) by H4
Case 2. JaK [pkn    pk1] 6= [pkn    pk1]
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Assertion ReasoningJaK [pkn    pk1] 6= [pkn    pk1] case 2 condition
) JaK [pkn    pk1] = ; since a is a predicate
) Ja; dup; (p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h]
 Ja; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h] by deànition of .
Case 3. JbK [pkn    pk1] 6= [pkn    pk1]
Assertion ReasoningJbK [pkn    pk1] 6= [pkn    pk1] case 3 condition
) JbK [pkn    pk1] = ; since b is a predicate
) Ja; dup; (p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h]
 Ja; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h] by deànition of .
Case 4. There does not exist [pkn    pk1] 2 rng(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K).
Assertion Reasoning
There does not exist [pkn    pk1] 2 rng(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) case 4 condition
) 8pk ; h: Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K [pk :: h] = ; by deànition
) Ja; dup; (p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h]
 Ja; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; bK [pk :: h] by deànition of .
Direction). If:
H1. a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b
H2. hpk2    pkni 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K)
H3. JaK [pk1] = f[pk1]g
H4. JbK [pkn] = f[pkn]g
then there exists a x such that:
G1. 1 < x < n,
G2. JwK [pkx] = f[pkx]g,
G3. 8i:1 < i < x JbK [pk i] = ;, and
G4. 8i:x < i < n JaK [pkn] = ;
SimplifyH1:
Assertion Reasoning
a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b  a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b deànition of H1
= G(a; dup; (p; t; dup)*; b)  G(a; dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; b) by theorem 2
= G(a)  G(dup; (p; t; dup)*; )  G(b)
 G(a)  G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; )  G(b) by deànition of 




[pk :: h] 2 rng( Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) deànition ofH2
) 9:;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) by Lemma 12
= pk1 ;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) by Lemma 11
We can rewrite our hypotheses as follows:
H3. pk1 ;pk1 2 G(a)
H4. pkn ;pkn 2 G(b)
From H2 and H1’, we can deduce a new hypothesis:
Assertion Reasoning
pk1 ;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(Jdup; (p; t; dup)*K) deànition ofH20
) pk1 ;pk1 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G(dup; (:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; ) deànition ofH10
) pk1 ;pk1 ; dup;pk1  pk1 ; pk2; dup    dup;pkn
2 G(dup)  G((:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; ) by 
) pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((:b; p; t; dup)*;w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; ) by 
) pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx  pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn
2 G((:b; p; t; dup)*)  G(w; (:a; p; t; dup)*; ) by 
) pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx  pkx ;pkx  pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn
2 G((:b; p; t; dup)*)  G(w)  G((:a; p; t; dup)*) by 
) 9n1n2:pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx  pkx ;pkx
 pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn
2 G((:b; p; t; dup)n1)  G(w)  G((:a; p; t; dup)n2) by deànitinon of *
) pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx  pkx ;pkx  pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn
2 G((:b; p; t; dup)n1)  G(w)  G((:a; p; t; dup)n2) introduce n1 and n2
) H5: pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx 2 G((:b; p; t; dup)n1) ^
H6: pkx ;pkx 2 G(w) ^
H7: pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((:a; p; t; dup)n2) immediate
Let x in the goal be n1 deàned above.
Proof of G1. We have that 1  x  n. If x = 1, then pk1pk1 ;2 G(a) and pk1pk1 ;2 G(:a), which is a
contradiction. Similarly, if x = n, then pknpkn ;2 G(b) and pknpkn ;2 G(:b), which is a contradiction.
Proof of G2.
Assertion Reasoning
pkx ;pkx 2 G(w) H6
) JwK hpkxi = hpkxi by lemma 13
Proof of G3.
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Lfing w : (p) foutgMw0 ::=
let pre = (vlan = w0; in; vlan w + vlan = w) in
let post = (out; vlan w0 + :out) in
pre; p; post
Figure 2. Slice desugaring.
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pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx 2 G((:b; p; t; dup)n1) H5
= pk1 ;pk2 ; dup    dup;pkx 2 G((:b; p; t; dup)x) since x = n1
) 8i:pki ;pk i 2 G(:b) by induction on x
) 8i:1 < i < x JbK [pk i] = ; by lemma 13
Proof of G4.
Assertion Reasoning
pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((:a; p; t; dup)n2) H7
= pkx ;pkx ; dup    dup;pkn 2 G((:a; p; t; dup)n x) since n2 = n  x
) 8i:pki ;pk i 2 G(:a) by induction on n  x
) 8i:x < i < n JaK [pkn] = ; by lemma 13
C. Application: Isolation
This section contains the full proofs and supporting lemmas for theorems in Section 6.
As Figure 2 shows, the desugared translation of slice policies relies heavily on predicates on worlds, which
we have written vlan = w. For the rest of this section, we will sometimes abbreviate this as simplyw. Hence, a
policy writtenw; p is equivalent to vlan = w; p. We also rely on a denesting lemma, drawn from [12], that shows
how to transform a summation under a star into a series of conjunctions and stars.
Lemma 16 (Denesting).
p*(qp*)*  (p+ q)*
Proof. Proposition 7 in [12].
Slice policies and predicates must be tag-free. Intuitively, tag-freedom asserts that policies and predicates
neither test nor modify the tag àeld. Formally, we use the following deànitions.
Deànition 3 (tag-free Policy). A policy p is tag-free when it commutes with any test of the slice àeld:
For all w, tag = w; p  p; tag = w.
Deànition 4 (tag-free Predicate). A predicate b is tag-free when it commutes with any modiàcation of the tag àeld:
For all w, tag  w; b  b; tag  w.
Unsurprisingly, certain commutativity properties also hold on the topology. In particular, the topology may
only modify the location information associated with each packet but not the packet itself. Hence, any tests on
the packet commute with the topology.
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Lemma 17 (Topology Preserves Packets). For all topologies t and predicates b, if b does not include tests of the form
sw = v for any value v, then b; t  t; b.
Proof. By induction on the structure of t. The base case follows immediately from KA-S-Z. The inductive
case is t = sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0 + t0.
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b; (sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0 + t0)
 b; sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0 + b; t0 KA-S-D-L.
 sw = sw ; pt = pt ; b; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0 + b; t0 BA-S-C.
 sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0; b+ b; t0 KA-M-PA-M-M-C.
 sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0; b+ t0; b IH.
Goal  (sw = sw ; pt = pt ; sw  sw 0; pt pt 0; +t0); b KA-S-D-R.
Suppose there exist two slices. The àrst only emits packets that, after traversing the topology, do not match
the ingress predicate of the second. A sequence composed of the àrst slice, the topology, and the second slice
is equivalent to drop.
Lemma 18 (No Slice Sequencing). For all slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, slice identiàers
w1; w2, and policies s1; s2; p; q, and topologies t, such that
• s1  Lfin1g w1 : (p) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2  Lfin2g w2 : (q) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2,
• H1: p, q, in1, in2, out1, out2 are all VLAN-free.
• H2: out1; t; dup; in2  drop,
then the following equivalence holds:
s1; t; dup; s2  drop
Proof. First, note that s1 and s2 have the following desugared forms.
pre1 = (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1)
post1 = (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
s1 = pre1; p; post1
= (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1); p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
pre2 = (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2)
post2 = (out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
s2 = pre2; q; post2
= (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; (out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
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s1; t; dup; s2
 pre1; p; post1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for s1 and s2.
 pre1; p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1); t; dup; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for post1.
 (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1); p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1);
t; dup; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for pre1.
 (w0; in1; vlan w1 + id);w1; p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1);
t; dup; pre2; q; post2 PA-M-F
and KA-S-D-R.
 (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1);w1; p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1);
t; dup; pre2; q; post2 BA-S-I,
PA-M-F,
and KA-S-D-R.
 pre1;w1; p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1); t; dup; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for pre1.
 pre1; p;w1; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1); t; dup; pre2; q; post2 H1.
 pre1; p;w1; out1; vlan w0; t; dup; pre2; q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 KA-S-D-L.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0; out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 H1.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0;w0; out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 PA-M-F.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0;w0; out1; t; dup;
(w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for pre2.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0;
(w0; out1; t; dup;w0; in2; vlan w2 + w0; out1; t; dup;w2); q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 KA-S-D-L.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0;
(w0; out1; t; dup;w0; in2; vlan w2 + drop); q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 H1, Lemma 17,
and PA-C.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0;
(w0; out1; t; dup; in2;w0; vlan w2 + drop); q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 BA-S-C.
 pre1; p;w1; vlan w0; (w0; drop; vlan w2 + drop); q; post2
+pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 H2.
 pre1; p;w1;:out1; t; dup; pre2; q; post2 KA-S-Z,
KA-Z-S,
and KA-P-Z.
 pre1; p;:out1; t; dup;w1; pre2; q; post2 H1 and Lemma 17.
 pre1; p;:out1; t; dup;w1; (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; post2 Substitution for pre2.






Now, suppose there are two slices that neither admit the same packets nor does one eject any packets the
other may inject. Every packet that enters the network will either be admitted to the àrst slice, or the second, or
dropped. Intuitively, if the two slices are indeed isolated, then if we restrict the packets that enter the network
to only those that will be injected into the àrst slice, then running both slices together should be equivalent to
running the àrst slice alone.
Theorem 4 (Slice/Slice Isolation). For all slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, slice identiàers
w1; w2, and policies s1; s2; p; q, and topologies t, such that
• s1  Lfin1g w1 : (p) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2  Lfin2g w2 : (q) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2,
• H1: p, q, in1, in2, out1, out2 are all VLAN-free.
• H2: in1; in2  drop,
• H3: out1; t; dup; in2  drop,
• H4: out2; t; dup; in1  drop,
• H5: out1; out2  drop,
then the following equality holds:
w0; in1; (s1; t; dup)*  w0; in1; ((s1 + s2); t; dup)*
Proof. First, note that s1 and s2 have the following desugared forms.
pre1 = (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1)
post1 = (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
s1 = pre1; p; post1
= (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1); p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
pre2 = (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2)
post2 = (out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
s2 = pre2; q; post2
= (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; (out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
Next, note that the following equivalence holds, which we will call L1: in1;w0; s2  drop.
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L1 in1;w0; s2
 in1;w0; pre2; q; post2 Substitution for s2.
 in1;w0; (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; post2 Substitution for pre2.
 (in1;w0;w0; in2; vlan w2 + in1;w0;w2); q; post2 KA-S-D-L.
 (in1;w0;w0; in2; vlan w2 + drop); q; post2 PA-C and KA-S-Z.
 in1;w0;w0; in2; vlan w2; q; post2 KA-P-Z.
 in1; in2;w0;w0; vlan w2; q; post2 BA-S-C.
 drop;w0;w0; vlan w2; q; post2 H2.
 drop KA-Z-S.
With L1, we can now show that w0; in1; (s1; t; dup)*  w0; in1; (s1 + s2; t; dup)*.
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w0; in1; ((s1 + s2); t; dup)*
 in1;w0; ((s1 + s2); t; dup)* BA-S-C
 in1;w0; (s1; t+ s2; t; dup)* KA-S-D-R.
 in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* Lemma 16.
 in1;w0; (id+ (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup)); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-U-R.
 in1;w0; (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)*
+in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-D-L,
KA-S-D-R,
and KA-S-O.
 in1;w0; (id+ (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)*)
+in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-U-L.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)*)
+in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-D-R.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* L1 and KA-P-Z.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup);
(id+ (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*); (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-U-L.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup)
+in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup); s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*;
(s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-D-L.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup)
+in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; drop; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* Lemma 18.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup) KA-S-Z
and KA-Z-S.
 in1;w0; (id+ (s1; t; dup)*; (s1; t; dup)) KA-S-D-L.
 in1;w0; (s1; t; dup)* KA-S-U-R.
 w0; in1; (s1; t; dup)* BA-S-C.
C.1 Shared Inbound Edges
In the previous section, we showed that two slices with unshared edges are isolated when composed. Next, we
relax the restriction on slice edges: given two slices, s1 and s2, the ingresses of the two slices may overlap, and
so may the egresses. Intuitively, this captures the case where a packet may be copied and processed by both
slices simultaneously. Clearly the behavior of the slices, when composed, is not equivalent to one of the slices
acting alone; but neither can one slice interfere with the copy of the packet traversing the other slice.
Theorem 6 (Slice/Slice Composition). For all tag-free slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, identi-
àers w1; w2, policies s1; s2, tag-free policies p1; p2, and topologies t, such that
• s1 = Lfin1g w1 : (p1) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2 = Lfin2g w2 : (p2) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2, w1 6= w0, w2 6= w0
• H1: out1; t; dup; in2  drop, and
• H2: out2; t; dup; in1  drop, then
((s1 + s2); t; dup)*  (s1; t; dup)* + (s2; t; dup)*.
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Proof. First, note that s1 and s2 have the following desugared forms.
pre1 = (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1)
post1 = (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
s1 = pre1; p; post1
= (w0; in1; vlan w1 + w1); p; (out1; vlan w0 + :out1)
pre2 = (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2)
post2 = (out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
s2 = pre2; q; post2
= (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q(out2; vlan w0 + :out2)
Assertion Reasoning
((s1 + s2); t; dup)*
 (s1; t+ s2; t; dup)* KA-S-D-R.
 (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* Lemma 16.
 (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t; dup; (id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*))* KA-S-U-L.
 (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t+ s2; t; dup; s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* KA-S-D-L, KA-S-O.
 (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t+ drop; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*)* Lemma 18.
 (s1; t; dup)*; (s2; t; dup)* KA-Z-S, KA-P-Z.
 (id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*); (id+ s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)*) KA-S-U-L.
 id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)* + s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)*
+s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)*; s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)* KA-S-D-L,
KA-S-D-R.
KA-O-S, KA-S-O.
 id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)* + s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)*
+s1; t; dup; (id+ (s1; t; dup)*; s1; t; dup);
s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)* KA-S-U-R.
 id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)* + s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)*
+s1; t; dup; s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)*
+(s1; t; dup)*; s1; t; dup; s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)* KA-S-D-R, KA-O-S,
KA-S-U-L.
 id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)* + s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)* Lemma 18, KA-Z-S,
KA-S-Z, KA-P-Z.
 id+ s1; t; dup; (s1; t; dup)* + id+ s2; t; dup; (s2; t; dup)* KA-P-I,
KA-P-C.
 (s1; t; dup)* + (s2; t; dup)* KA-S-U-L.
Finally, we show that Theorem 4 follows from Theorem 6.
Corollary 1. For all tag-free slice ingress and egress predicates in1; out1; in2; out2, identiàers w1; w2, policies s1; s2,
tag-free policies p1; p2, and topologies t, such that
• s1 = Lfin1g w1 : (p1) fout1gMw0 ,
• s2 = Lfin2g w2 : (p2) fout2gMw0 ,
• H0: w1 6= w2, w1 6= w0, w2 6= w0
• H1: out1; t; dup; in2  drop,
• H2: out2; t; dup; in1  drop,
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• H3: in1; in2  drop, then
in1; tag = w0; ((s1 + s2); t; dup)*
 in1; tag = w0; (s1; t; dup)*
Proof. By Theorem 6 and KA-S-D-L, we have in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0; (s2)*.
Assertion Reasoning
in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0; (s2)*
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0 + in1;w0; s2; (s2)* KA-S-U-L
and KA-S-D-L.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0
+in1;w0; (w0; in2; vlan w2 + w2); q; post2; (s2)* Substitution for s2.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0
+(in1;w0;w0; in2; vlan w2 + in1;w0;w2); q; post2; (s2)* KA-S-D-L.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0
+(in1; in2;w0;w0; vlan w2 + in1;w0;w2); q; post2; (s2)* BA-S-C.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0
+(drop;w0;w0; vlan w2 + in1; drop); q; post2; (s2)* H4 and PA-C.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0 + drop KA-S-Z,
KA-Z-S,
and KA-P-Z.
 in1;w0; (s1)* + in1;w0 KA-P-Z.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; s1; (s1)* + in1;w0 KA-S-U-L.
 in1;w0 + in1;w0; s1; (s1)* KA-P-C
and KA-P-I.
 in1;w0; (s1)* KA-S-U-L.
C.2 Weakening the Hypotheses
The hypotheses of Theorem 4 restrict its application to two slices running alone on the network. While such
a result provides insight into the nature of slice interaction, we show a stronger result in this section that
demonstrates slice isolation in the presence of other slices and activity in the network.
In particular, slices drop trafàc with any tag not their own or w0—this prevents them from interfering with
trafàc that has been injected into another slice. In turn, if a slice is compiled with a tagw, it can run in isolation
on the same network as any Netuser policy, so long as that policy drops w-tagged trafàc.
Deànition 5 (Dropping w-tagged Trafàc). A policy p drops w-tagged trafàc when
• tag = w; p  drop, and
• p; tag = w  drop.
Lemma 19 (No Program Sequencing). For all slice ingress and egress predicates in; out, slice identiàersw, and policies
s; p; q, and topologies t, such that
• s = Lfing w : (p) foutgMw0 ,
• H0: w 6= w0,
• H1: p, q, in, and out are tag-free,
• H2: out; t; dup; q  drop and q; t; dup; in  drop,
• H3: q drops w-tagged trafàc,
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then the following equivalences hold:
s; t; dup; q  drop
q; t; dup; s  drop
Proof. First, note that s has the following desugared form.
pre = (w0; in; tag  w + w)
post = (out; tag  w0 + :out)
s = pre; p; post
= (w0; in; tag  w + w); p; (out; tag  w0 + :out)
Case 1: s; t; dup; q  drop. We have:
Assertion Reasoning
s; t; dup; q
 pre; p; post; t; dup; q Substitution for s.
 pre; p; (out; tag  w0 + :out); t; dup; q Substitution for post.
 pre; p; (out; tag  w0; t; dup; q + :out; t; dup; q) KA-S-D-R.
 pre; p; (tag  w0; out; t; dup; q + :out; t; dup; q) H1, PA-M-F-C.
 pre; p; (drop+ :out; t; dup; q) H2.
 pre; p;:out; t; dup; q KA-P-C, KA-P-Z.
 (w0; in; tag  w + w); p;:out; t; dup; q Substitution for pre.
 (w0; in; tag  w;w + id;w); p;:out; t; dup; q PA-M-F, KA-O-S.
 (w0; in; tag  w + id);w; p;:out; t; dup; q KA-S-D-R.
 (w0; in; tag  w + id); p;:out; t; dup;w; q H2, Lemma 17.
 (w0; in; tag  w + id); p;:out; t; dup; drop H3.
 drop KA-S-Z.
Case 2: q; t; dup; s  drop. We have:
Assertion Reasoning
q; t; dup; s
 q; t; dup; pre; p; post Substitution for s.
 q; t; dup; (w0; in; tag  w + w); p; post Substitution for pre.
 (q; t; dup;w0; in; tag  w + q; t; dup;w); p; post KA-S-D-L.
 (q; t; dup;w0; in; tag  w + q;w; t; dup); p; post PA-O-F-C, Lemma 17.
 (q; t; dup;w0; in; tag  w + drop; t; dup); p; post H3.
 q; t; dup;w0; in; tag  w; p; post KA-Z-S, KA-P-Z.
 q; t; dup; in;w0; tag  w; p; post BA-S-C.
 drop;w0; tag  w; p; post H2.
 drop KA-Z-S.
Theorem 1 (Slice/Program Composition). For all tag-free slice ingress and egress predicates in; out, identiàers w,
policies s; q, tag-free policies p, and topologies t, such that
• s = Lfing w : (p) foutgMw0 ,
• H0: w 6= w0,
• H1: out; t; dup; q  drop,
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• H2: q; t; dup; in  drop,
• H3: q drops w-tagged trafàc, then
((s+ q); t; dup)*  (s; t; dup)* + (q; t; dup)*
Proof. First, note that s has the following desugared form.
pre = (w0; in; vlan w + w)
post = (out; vlan w0 + :out)
s = pre; p; post
= (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out)
Assertion Reasoning
((s+ q); t; dup)*
 (s; t+ q; t; dup)* KA-S-D-R.
 (s; t; dup)*; (q; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*)* Lemma 16.
 (s; t; dup)*; (q; t; dup; (id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*))* KA-S-U-L.
 (s; t; dup)*; (q; t; dup+ q; t; dup; s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*)* KA-S-D-L, KA-S-O.
 (s; t; dup)*; (q; t; dup+ drop; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*)* Lemma 19.
 (s; t; dup)*; (q; t; dup)* KA-Z-S, KA-P-Z.
 (id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*); (id+ q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)*) KA-S-U-L.
 id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)* + q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)*
+s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)*; q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)* KA-S-D-L,
KA-S-D-R.
KA-O-S, KA-S-O.
 id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)* + q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)*
+s; t; dup; (id+ (s; t; dup)*; s; t; dup);
q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)* KA-S-U-R.
 id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)* + q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)*
+s; t; dup; q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)*
+(s; t; dup)*; s; t; dup; q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)* KA-S-D-R, KA-O-S,
KA-S-U-L.
 id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)* + q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)* Lemma 19, KA-Z-S,
KA-S-Z, KA-P-Z.
 id+ s; t; dup; (s; t; dup)* + id+ q; t; dup; (q; t; dup)* KA-P-I,
KA-P-C.
 (s; t; dup)* + (q; t; dup)* KA-S-U-L.
With this theorem, we can see that isolation is preserved across n-ary slice composition.
Lemma 20 (Parallel Composition Preserves w-dropping). If policies p; q drop w-tagged trafàc, then p + q drops
w-tagged trafàc.
Proof. We have the following hypotheses:
• tag = w; p  p; tag = w  drop
• tag = w; q  q; tag = w  drop
And we must show the following goals:
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• tag = w; (p+ q)  drop
• (p+ q); tag = w  drop
The result is follows from the hypotheses and KA-S-D-L, KA-P-Z, and the substitution of equals
for equals.
Lemma 21 (Parallel Composition Preserves Disjoint Boundaries). If pi; t; dup; pj  drop for all pairs (i; j) for
i 6= j; 1 <= i <= n; 1 <= j <= n, then p1; t; dup; (p2 + p3)  drop and (p2 + p3); t; dup; p1  drop.
Proof. The result follows from the hypotheses, KA-S-D-L, and KA-S-D-R.
Lemma 22 (Slices Drop w-tagged Trafàc). For all slices s = Lfing w : (p) foutgMw0 and tags w0 such that
w0 6= w 6= w0, s drops w0-tagged trafàc.
Proof. First, note that s has the following desugared form.
pre = (w0; in; vlan w + w)
post = (out; vlan w0 + :out)
s = pre; p; post
= (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out)
Goal 1: tag = w0; s  drop. We have:
Assertion Reasoning
tag = w0; s
 w0; (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out) Substitution for s.
 (w0;w0; in; vlan w + w0;w); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out) KA-S-D-L.
 (drop; in; vlan w + drop); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out) Hyp. and PA-C.
 drop KA-S-Z, KA-P-Z.
Goal 2: s; tag = w0  drop. We have:
Assertion Reasoning
s; tag = w0
 (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; vlan w0 + :out);w0 Substitution for s
 (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; vlan w0;w0 + :out;w0) KA-S-D-R
 (w0; in; vlan w + w); p; (out; drop+ :out;w0) Hyp., PA-M-F, PA-C
 (w0; in; vlan w + w); p;:out;w0 KA-S-Z, KA-P-Z
 (w0; in; vlan w + w);w0; p;:out As policy and predicates are tag-free
 (w0; in; vlan w;w0 + w;w0); p;:out KA-S-D-R
 (w0; in; drop+ w;w0); p;:out Hyp., PA-M-F, PA-C
 (w0; in; drop+ drop); p;:out Hyp., PA-C
 drop KA-S-Z, KA-P-Z.
Proposition 1 (N-ary Slices are Isolated). For slices s1; : : : ; sn compiled with tags w1; : : : ; wn such that for all pairs
(i; j) for i 6= j; 1 <= i <= n; 1 <= j <= n,
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• wi 6= wj 6= w0, and
• si; t; dup; sj  sj ; t; dup; si  drop, then
((s1 + : : :+ sn); t; dup)*  (s1; t; dup)* + : : :+ (sn; t; dup)*
Proof. By induction on n. The base case (n = 1) is immediate. We proceed with the inductive step.
1. Let q = (s1 + : : :+ sk).
2. From Lemma 20 and the hypotheses, we have that q drops wk+1-tagged trafàc.
3. From Lemma 21 and the hypotheses, we have that sk+1; t; dup; q  q; t; dup; sk+1  drop.
From Theorem 1 we have:
Assertion Reasoning
((sk+1 + q); t; dup)*  (sk+1; t; dup)* + (q; t; dup)* Theorem 1.
 (sk+1; t; dup)* + ((s1 + : : :+ sk); t; dup)* Substitution for q.
 (sk+1; t; dup)* + (s1; t; dup)* + : : :+ (sk; t; dup)* Induction hypothesis.
 (s1; t; dup)* + : : :+ (sk; t; dup)* + (sk+1; t; dup)* KA-P-C.
D. Application: Compilation
This section presents the full proofs and supporting lemmas of the theorems in Section 7.
Deànition 6 (Net Sub-languages). We deàne the following sub-languages ofNet.
• p 2 Net (dup;sw ) if p does not contain dup or sw  n.
• p 2 Net (dup;sw ;) if p does not contain dup or sw  n or p*.
• p 2 Net (dup;sw ;;sw) if p does not contain dup or sw  n or p* or sw = n.
• p 2 Net (sw) if p has the formP
i
sw = i; pi and for i : 1::n, pi 2 Net (dup;sw ;;sw).
We call policies p 2 Net dup;sw user policies. This is the set of policies thatNet programmers may
write and that we an implement. We call policies p 2 Net sw switch normal form policies. Such policies have
one component that is specialized to each switch in the network.
Compilation is then a series of steps, each reàning or eliminating a fragment of the full Net language.
1. Star elimination. Transform a user policy into an equivalent user policy without Kleene star.
2. Switch specialization. Transform a star-free user policy into switch normal form.
3. OpenFlow normal form. Transform a policy in switch normal form into OpenFlow normal form.
D.1 Star Elimination
Lemma 7 (Star Elimination). If p 2 Net (dup;sw ), then there exists p0 2 Net (dup;sw ;) and p  p0.
Proof. The proof begins by showing that p0 can be obtained from the normal form used in the completeness
theorem.More speciàcally, let p00 be the policy obtained from p by the normalization construction of lemma4. By
construction, dup can only appear in the normal formof an expression already containing dup, therefore p00 does
not contain dup. Moreover, R(p00)  I and p00 does not contain dup, therefore R(p00)  At;P . Consequently,
p00 does not contain Kleene star.
Let us now prove that any assignment of the form sw  swi in p00 is preceded in the same term by the
corresponding test sw = swi. Because p does not contain any assignment of the form sw  sw i, it commutes
with any test of the form sw = sw i, and therefore p00 also commutes with any test of the form sw = sw i. p00
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can be written as a sum of ;p for some atoms  and complete assignments p. Suppose for a contradiction that
term,  contains a test sw = sw i, and p contains an assignment sw  sw j , with sw i 6= sw j . Then
; (sw = sw i); p
00; (sw = sw j)  ; p 6= 0
; (sw = sw j); p
00; (sw = sw i) = 0
but those two terms are also equal, which is a contradiction.
Therefore any assignment of the form sw  swi in p00 is preceded, in the same term, by the corresponding
test sw = swi, and can be removed using axiom PA-F-M to produce the desired p0. Tests and assignments
to other àelds than sw could appear in between, but we can use the commutativity axioms PA-M-M-C
and PA-M-F-C to move the assignment sw  swi to just after the test sw = swi.
D.2 Switch Normal Form
First, we show that any policy inNet (dup;sw ;) can be specialized to a given switch.
Lemma 8 (Switch Specialization). If p 2 Net (dup;sw ;), then for all switches sw i, there exists p0 2
Net (dup;sw ;;sw) such that sw = sw i; p  sw = sw i; p0.
Proof. Let g be the unique homomorphism of Net deàned on primitive programs by:
g(sw = sw) ,
(
id if sw = sw i
drop otherwise
g(f  v) , f  v
g(dup) , dup
For every primitive program element x of Net (dup;sw ;), we have both:
sw = sw i;x  g(x); sw = sw i
g(x); sw = sw i  sw = sw i; g(x)
Hence, applying Lemma 4.4 in [2] twice shows:
sw = sw i; p  g(p); sw = sw i
g(p); sw = sw i  sw = sw i; g(p)
By the deànition of g, any occurrence of sw = v in p is replaced by either id or drop in g(p). Moreover,
since p 2 Net (dup;sw ;), it follows that g(p) does not contain any occurrence of sw = v and since
p0 = g(p) 2 Net (dup;sw ;;sw) we also have
sw = sw i; p  sw = sw i; p0
As there are ànitely many switches in a network (codiàed in Axiom PA-M-A), we can use Lemma 8
to show that any star-free user policy can be put into switch normal form.
Lemma 23 (Switch-Normal-Form). If p 2 Net (dup;sw ;) then there exists p0 2 Net sw such that p  p0.
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ONF Action Sequence a ::= id j f  n; a
ONF Action Sum as ::= drop j a+ as
ONF Predicate b ::= id j f = n; b
ONF Local ` ::= as j if b then as else `
ONF p ::= drop j (sw = sw; `) + p




 id; p KA-O-S.
 (P
i
sw = i); p PA-M-A.
 P
i
(sw = i; p) KA-S-D-R.
 P
i
(sw = i; pi) where pi 2 Net dup;sw ;*;sw Lemma 8.
D.3 OpenFlow Normal Form
Finally, we show that any policy in switch normal form is equivalent to a policy in OpenFlow normal form.
Notice that the deànition of OpenFlow normal form (ONF) in Figure 7 is nearly identical to the deànition
of switch normal form. The key difference lies in the form of the switch-local policy fragments. In ONF, these
policy fragments must be in ONF local form. Hence, we show how to transform a switch-local policy fragment
into ONF local form.
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the Net policy. We will see that for each combinator,
two policy fragments in ONF local form can be joined to produce a policy in ONF local form. After deàning
several lemmas useful throughout the remainder of the section, we show that parallel composition, sequential
composition, and predicate compilation are all sound. We conclude by showing stating and proving the full
compiler soundness theorem.
Coq-based Lemmas. Damien Pous has released a sound and complete decision procedure for Kleene algebras
with tests, implemented in the Coq theorem prover 4. For several lemmas that rely on lengthy program
transformations using only the standard KAT axioms, we appeal to this decision procedure. The Coq code
for each lemma is reproduced below.
Lemma atom_plus_onf_is_onf `{L: laws} n (b : tst n) (p q r : X n n):
p + [b];q + [!b];r == [b];(p + q) + [!b];(p + r).
Proof. kat. Qed.
Lemma union_is_ite_nf `{L: laws} n (b1 b2 : tst n) (p1 p2 q : X n n):
[b1];([b2];p1 + [!b2];p2) + [!b1];q ==
[b1];[b2];p1 + [b1];[!b2];p2 + [!b1];[b2];q + [!b1];[!b2];q.
Proof. kat. Qed.
Lemma demorgans `{L: laws} n (b1 b2 : tst n) (p1 p2 q : X n n):




Lemma ite_nf_is_onf `{L: laws} n (b1 b2 : tst n) (p1 p2 q : X n n):
[b1];[b2];p1 + [b1];[!b2];p2 + [!b1];[b2];q + [!b1];[!b2];q ==
[b1 \cap b2];p1 + [!(b1 \cap b2)];([b1];p2 + [!b1];q).
Proof. kat. Qed.
Lemma nested_onf_is_onf `{L: laws} n (b1 b2 : tst n) (p1 p2 q : X n n):
[b1];([b2];p1 + [!b2];p2) + [!b1];q ==
[b1 \cap b2];p1 + [!(b1 \cap b2)];([b1];p2 + [!b1];q).
Proof. kat. Qed.
Lemma union_onf_is_onf `{L: laws} n (b1 b2 : tst n) (a1 a2 p' q' : X n n):
[b1];a1 + [!b1];p' + [b2];a2 + [!b2];q' ==
[b1 \cap b2];(a1 + a2) + [!(b1 \cap b2)];([b1];(a1 + q')
+ [!b1];(p' + [b2];a2 + [!b2];q')).
Proof. kat. Qed.
Lemma joined_policies `{L: laws} n (s1 s2 t : X n n):
((s1 + s2); t)^* == ((s1; t)^* + (s2; t)^*)^*.
Proof. kat. Qed.
Helper lemmas. Several subgoals appear repeatedly in this last part of the proof of compiler correctness. The
àrst simply observes that every test is either true or false (BA-EM), and so every programmay be
broken into a sum, wherein either the test or its negation is sequenced with the program.




2  id; b; p KA-O-S
3  (a+ :a); b; p BA-E-M
Goal  a; b; p+ :a; b; p KA-S-D-R.
Consider ONF as a series of nested if statements for a moment. During the proofs, we will often conclude
that the body of both branches of the topmost if statement are themselves nested if statements in ONF. In order
to show that the expression as a whole is indeed in ONF, we must show that the structure is equivalent to a
single series of nested if statements.
Lemma 25 (Nested ONF is ONF). For all ONF predicates a and policies p; q in ONF, there exists a policy r in ONF
such that r  a; p+ :a; q.
Proof. By induction on the structure of p.
Case 1. We have p = as1, and the result is immediate.
Case 2. We have p = b; as+ :b; q.
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a; (b; as+ :b; q) + :a; p0
 (a; b); as+ :(a; b); (a; q + :a; p0) Coq Lemma nested_onf_is_onf.
Applying the induction hypothesis to (a; q + :a; p0) yields r0 in ONF. Hence, our goal is satisàed with
(a; b); as+ :(a; b); r0.
Finally, there are several commutativity conditions that are essential to reasoning about Net program
transformations.
Lemma 26 (Negative Field Commutativity). For all àelds f1; f2 and values n1; n2 such that f1 6= f2, f1  n1;:f2 =
n2  :f2 = n2; f1  n1.
Proof. By PA-M-M-C, we have f1  n1; f2 = n2  f2 = n2; f1  n1. The desired result then follows
from [14, Lemma 2.3.1].
Lemma 27 (Action Atom Seq Filter Commutativity). For all ONF action sequences a1, àelds f , and values n, one of
the following holds:
• a1; f = n  f = n; a1 and a1;:f = n  :f = n; a1,
• a1; f = n  a1 and a1;:f = n  drop, or
• a1; f = n  drop and a1;:f = n  a1.
Proof. By induction on the structure of a1. We have two cases. The base case, a1  id, is trivial. We continue
with the induction case, a1  f1  n1; a01. Applying the induction hypothesis to a01, f , and n yields three new
cases:
Case 1. We have f1  n1; a01; f = n  f1  n1; f = n; a01 and f1  n1; a01;:f = n  f1  n1;:f = n; a01.
There are three cases:
Case 1a. If f1 6= f , then f1  n1; f = n; a01  f = n; f1  n1; a01 by PA-M-F-C. By Lemma 26, we
also have f1  n1;:f2 = n2  :f2 = n2; f1  n1.
Case 1b. If f1  f and n  n1, then f1  n1; f = n; a01  f1  n1; a01 by PA-M-F. We also have:
Assertion Reasoning
1 f1  n1;:f = n; a01
2  f1  n1; f = n;:f = n; a01 PA-M-F.
3  f1  n1; drop; a01 BA-C.
Goal  drop KA-Z-S and KA-S-Z.




1 f  n1;:f = n; a01
2  drop+ f  n1;:f = n; a01 KA-P-Z and KA-P-C.
3  f  n1; drop; a01 + f  n1;:f = n; a01 KA-S-Z and KA-Z-S.
4  f  n1; f = n1; f = n; a01 + f  n1;:f = n; a01 PA-C.
5  f  n1; f = n; a01 + f  n1;:f = n; a01 PA-M-F-C.
6  f  n1; (f = n+ :f = n); a01 KA-S-D-L, KA-O-S, KA-S-D-R.
Goal  f  n1; a01 BA-E-M, KA-S-O.
Case 2. We know that
• a01; f = n  a01, and
• a01;:f = n  drop.
Hence, by substitution and KA-S-Z,
• f1  n1; a01; f = n  f1  n1; a01, and
• f1  n1; a01;:f = n  drop.
Case 3. We know that
• a01; f = n  drop, and
• a01;:f = n  a01.
Hence, by substitution and KA-S-Z,
• f1  n1; a01; f = n  drop, and
• f1  n1; a01;:f = n  f1  n1; a01.
Lemma 28 (Action Atom Seq Predicate Commutativity). For all ONF action sequences a1 and ONF predicates b1,
one of three cases holds:
• there exists an ONF predicate b2 such that a1; b1  b2; a1 and a1;:b1  :b2; a1,
• a1; b1  a1 and a1;:b1  drop, or
• a1; b1  drop and a1;:b1  a1.
Proof. By induction on the structure of b1. The base case, b1  id, is trivial, leaving the inductive case
b1  f = n; b01. We have a1; f = n; b01. Applying Lemma 27 to a1; f = n yields three cases.
Case 1. We have that a1; f = n  f = n; a1. Hence, a1; f = n; b01  f = n; a1; b01 and the goal follows from
an application of the induction hypothesis.
The same reasoning resolves the negative case, where a1;:f = n  :f = n; a1.
Case 2. We have that a1; f = n  a1. Hence, a1; f = n; b01  a1; b01 and the goal follows from an application
of the induction hypothesis.
The negative case, where a1;:f = n  drop, follows from rewriting and KA-S-Z.
Case 3. We have that a1; f = n  drop. Hence, a1; f = n; b01  drop by KA-S-Z.
The negative case, where a1;:f = n  a1, proceeds as follows. By rewriting, we have a1;:f = n; b01 
a1; b
0
1 and the goal follows from an application of the induction hypothesis.
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Parallel Composition Preserves ONF. In this section, we show that the parallel composition of two policies
in ONF is itself equivalent to a policy in ONF. The proof proceeds by mutual induction on the structure of both
subpolicies, and the section presents supporting lemmas leading up to the ànal result.
Lemma 29 (Action Plus Action is ONF). For all ONF action sums as1 and as2, there exists an ONF action sum as3
such that as1 + as2  as3.
Proof. Both as1 and as2 can take one of two forms, drop or a + as0, leading to four cases. The goal follows
immediately from KA-P-Z in all but the ànal case.
Case 4. We have as1  a1+as01 and as2  a2+as02. as3  a1+a2+as01+as02, which can be put into normal
form via list concatenation.
Lemma 30 (Action Plus ONF is ONF). For all ONF action sums as1 and policies p  b; as2 + :b; q in ONF, there
exists a policy r in ONF such that r  as1 + p.
Proof. By induction on p.
Case 1. We have p  as2. The goal follows immediately from Lemma 29.
Case 2. We have p  b; as2 + :b; q.
Assertion Reasoning
1 as1 + b; as2 + :b; q
2  b; as1 + :b; as1 + b; as2 + :b; q Lemma 24.
3  (b; as1) + (b; as2) + (:b; as1) + (:b; q) KA-P-C.
4  b; (as1 + as2) + :b; (as1 + q) KA-S-D-L.
The goal then follows from an application of the induction hypothesis to (as1 + q).
Lemma 31 (Parallel Composition Preserves ONF). For all policies p; q in OpenFlow normal form, there exists r such
that p+ q  r and r is in OpenFlow normal form.
Proof. By induction on p and split in to cases based on the structure of q.
Case 1. We have p  as1 and q  as2, and r  as1 + as2. The goal follows from Lemma 29.
Case 2. We have p  as1 and q  b; as2 + :b; q0, and r  as1 + b; as2 + :b; q0. The goal follows from
Lemma 30.
Case 3. Wehave p  b; as1+:b; p0 and q  as2, and r  b; as1+:b; p0+as2. The goal follows fromLemma 30
and KA-P-C.
Case 4. We have p  b1; as1 + :b1; p0 and q  b2; as2 + :b2; q0, and r  b1; as1 + :b1; p0 + b2; as2 + :b2; q0.
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1 b1; as1 + :b1; p0 + b2; as2 + :b2; q0
2 (b1; b2); (as1 + as2)
+ :(b1; b2); (b1; (as1 + q0) + :b1; (p0 + b2; as2 + :b2; q0)) Coq Lemma union_onf_is_onf.
3 (b1; b2); (as1 + as2)
+ :(b1; b2); (b1; r1 + :b1; (p0 + b2; as2 + :b2; q0)) (for some r1 in ONF) by Lemma 30.
4 (b1; b2); (as1 + as2)
+ :(b1; b2); (b1; r1 + :b1; (p0 + q)) Substitute q.
5 (b1; b2); (as1 + as2)
+ :(b1; b2); (b1; r1 + :b1; r2) IH.
6 (b1; b2); (as1 + as2) + :(b1; b2); r3 Lemma 25.
Sequential Composition Preserves ONF. In this section, we show that the sequential composition of two
policies in ONF is itself equivalent to a policy in ONF. The proof proceeds by mutual induction on the
structure of both subpolicies and the structure of ONF action sums in the left-hand policy. The section presents
supporting lemmas leading up to the ànal result.
Lemma 32 (Conjunct Seq Conjunct is ONF). For all ONF action sequences a1; a2, there exists an ONF action sequence
a3  a1; a2.
Proof. By induction on the structure of a1.
Case 1. We have a1  id and a3  id; a2  a2 by KA-O-S.
Case 2. We have a1  f  n; a01 and a3  (f  n; a01); a2.
Assertion Reasoning
1 a3  (f  n; a01); a2
2  f  n; a01; a2 KA-S-A
Goal  f  n; a03 IH
Lemma 33 (Conjunct Seq Action is ONF). For all ONF action sequences a and ONF action sums as1, there exists an
ONF action sum as2  a; as1.
Proof. We begin with induction on as1. The àrst case is trivial: as2  a; drop  drop by KA-S-Z. In the
second case, as1  a1 + as01.
Assertion Reasoning
1 as2  a; (a1 + as01)
2  a; a1 + a; as01 KA-S-D-L.
3  a2 + a; as01 Lemma 32.
Goal  a2 + as02 IH
Lemma 34 (Action Seq Action is ONF). For all ONF action sums as1 and as2, there exists an ONF action sum as3
such that as1; as2  as3.
Proof. By induction on as1. In the àrst case, as1  drop, and the goal follows from KA-Z-S. In the latter
case, as1  a1 + as01.
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1 as3  (a1 + as01); as2
2  a1; as2 + as01; as2 KA-S-D-R.
3  as31 + as01; as2 Lemma 33.
4  as31 + as32 IH.
Goal  as03 Lemma 29.
Lemma 35 (Action Atom Seq ONF is ONF). For all ONF action sequences a1 and policies p in ONF, there exists a
policy q in ONF such that q  a1; p.
Proof. By induction on p. The base case, p  as, is discharged by Lemma 33. That leaves the inductive case,
p  b; as+ :b; p0 and q  a1; (b; as+ :b; p0).
Assertion Reasoning
1 q  a1; (b; as+ :b; p0)
2  a1; b; as+ a1;:b; p0 KA-S-D-L.
Applying Lemma 28 to a1 and b yields three cases:
Case 1. We have that a1; b  b; a1 and a1;:b  :b; a1. After rewriting line 2 from the proof table above, we
have:
Assertion Reasoning
1 b; a1; as+ :b; a1; p0
2 b; a1; as+ :b; q0 (for some q0 in ONF) by IH
2 b; as2 + :b; q0 (for some as2) by Lemma 33
Case 2. We have that a1; b  a1 and a1;:b  drop. After rewriting, we have:
Assertion Reasoning
1 a1; as+ drop; p0
2 a1; as KA-Z-S and KA-P-Z.
3 as2 (for some as2) by Lemma 33
Case 3. We have that a1; b  drop and a1;:b  a1. After rewriting, we have:
Assertion Reasoning
1 drop; as+ a1; p0
2 a1; p0 KA-Z-S and KA-P-Z.
3 q0 by IH
Lemma 36 (Action Seq ONF is ONF). For all ONF action sums as and policies p in ONF, there exists a policy q in ONF
such that q  as; p.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of as. The base case, as = drop, is trivial. This leaves the inductive case,
where as = a+ as0.
Assertion Reasoning
1 (a+ as0); p
2  a; p+ as0; p KA-S-D-R.
3  r + as0; p Lemma 35.
4  r + q0 IH.
The goal then follows from applying Lemma 31.
Lemma 37 (Sequential Composition Preserves ONF). For all policies p; q in OpenFlow normal form, there exists r
such that p; q  r and r is in OpenFlow normal form.
Proof. By induction on p.
Case 1. We have p = as1 and r  as1; q. The result follows from Lemma 36.
Case 2. We have p = b; as1 + :b; p0 and r  (b; as1 + :b; p0); q.
Assertion Reasoning
1 (b; as1 + :b; p0); q
2  b; as1; q + :b; p0; q KA-S-D-R.
3  b; r1 + :b; p0; q (for some r1 in ONF) by Lemma 36.
4  b; r1 + :b; r2 IH.
The result then follows from applying Lemma 25.
Predicate Compilation is Sound. We can also see that Net predicates have equivalents in ONF.
Lemma 38 (Filter is ONF). For all policies p = a, there exists a policy q in ONF such that p  q.
Proof. By induction on the structure of a. The cases of id and drop are immediate.
Case: f = n.
Assertion Reasoning
1 f = n
2  f = n+ drop KA-P-Z.




2  :b; id KA-S-O.
3  drop+ :b; id KA-P-Z, KA-P-C.
Goal  b; drop+ :b; id KA-S-Z.
Case: b+ c. From the induction hypothesis, we have q  q0 + q00. The result then follows from an application
of Lemma 31.
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Case: b; c. From the induction hypothesis, we have q  q0; q00. The result then follows from an application of
Lemma 37.
Compiler Soundness. Finally, we show that any switch fragment of a policy in switch normal form has an
equivalent policy in OpenFlow normal form. Hence, any user policy has an equivalent policy in OpenFlow
normal form.
Lemma 9 (Switch-local Compilation).
If p 2 Net (dup;sw ;*;sw) then there exists a policy p0 such that p  p0 and p0 2 ONF:
Proof. By induction on the structure of p.
Case 1. We have p = a. The goal follows from applying Lemma 38.
Case 2. We have p = f  n (and f 6= sw). Applying KA-S-O yields p  f  n; id, which satisàes our
goal.
Case 3. We have p = q+ r. Applying the induction hypothesis to q and r yields p  q0+ r0, after substitution.
The goal then follows from Lemma 31.
Case 4. We have p = q; r. Applying the induction hypothesis to q and r yields p  q0; r0, after substitution.
The goal then follows from Lemma 37.
Case 5. We have p = p0*. This case is inconsistent with the hypothesis (p0* 62 Net dup;sw ;*;sw).
Theorem 38 (User policies can be compiled to G-ONF). For all user policies p 2 Net dup;sw there exists a
policy p0 2 G-ONF such that p  p0.
Proof. By Lemmas S-E, S-N-F and S-L-C.
D.4 Optimizations
Lemma 39 (If Compress). if b1 then as else if b2 then as else `  if b1 + b2 then as else `
Proof. By desugaring the if statements and then applying boolean algebra and distributivity axioms.
Lemma10 (Fall-throughElimination). If b1  b2 then if b1 then as else if b2 then as else `  if b2 then as else ` .
Proof.
if b1 then as else if b2 then as else `
 if b1 + b2 then as else ` by If Compress
 if b2 then as else ` by b1  b2
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